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 This study explores the different choices taken by members of the Cambodian 
society in the traumatic period of the Khmer Rouge Communist regime between 1975 
and 1979. My thesis attempts to contribute to the existing scholarship on that period by 
amalgamating individual stories into various themes altogether representing the outlines 
of a common social history. While the repression and suffering were irrefutable, I argue 
that there were some spaces for decision-making through cooperation, negotiation or 
resistance to the radical Khmer Rouge government. I chose to survey the whole 
Cambodian population without segregating their social background; for that reason, the 
main purpose of this thesis was to demonstrate the range of decisions and the complex 
relationship between representatives of the state and members of society. My thesis seeks 
to reveal that many Cambodians demonstrated insightful observations about their 
situation and a resourcefulness that transcends a simple victim/perpetrator binary.  
Divided in six chapters, this thesis discusses the different reactions from 
Cambodians to certain unilaterally imposed policies from the Khmer Rouge. In Chapter 
Two, I discuss the different reasons that motivated the Khmer Rouge soldiers to join the 
revolution and demonstrate the heterogeneity of the organization. In Chapter Three, I 
survey the necessary cooperative attitudes that were necessary under those circumstances, 
but nevertheless varied in their manifestations and did not exclude instances of 
disobedience. Chapter Four examines the seemingly opposite stance of disobedience and 
resistance against the established order. In Chapte
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took the decision to flee the Khmer Rouge either internally or externally. Finally, Chapter 
Six unveils how segregated social groups, including Khmer Rouge soldiers and officials, 
often recreated market conditions despite the rules against private ownership and the 
severe punishment associated with a transgression of such rules.  
From these different themes, a conclusion arises. These different stories ought to 
dispel the notion of passivity of Cambodian society during the Khmer Rouge period. 
Despite clear limitations and very high costs, there were still several spaces for individual 
choices. Each chapter also addresses the notion that the boundary between the state and 
society was not that well-defined, and this reality was possible because the state itself had 





Chapter 1: A Post-Mortem of Cambodia 
 
 After almost two years of tensions and sporadic fighting, Vietnam finally decided 
to terminate the Khmer Rouge1 regime in Cambodia in December 1978.2 A few weeks 
later, this campaign was already over as 100,000 Vietnamese troops, with the support of 
20,000 Cambodian refugees, controlled 17 out of 19 provinces in Cambodia.3 Despite 
this definitive defeat, the Khmer Rouge lingered as a fighting force for almost two 
decades of irregular warfare. Great powers like China, the United States, and other 
Western countries with the assistance of Thailand decided to rebuild the defeated Khmer 
Rouge organization to ensure that the latter was able to pursue a disrupting fighting role 
in Cambodia against its new Vietnamese masters.4  
 The scale of the devastation in Cambodia was unfathomable. This devastation was 
largely the aggregate result of the recent invasion by the Vietnam People’s Army, the 
scorched-earth strategy from the rapidly retreating Khmer Rouge, the previous intense 
civil war opposing the Khmer Rouge to the pro-American Lon Nol regime from 1970 to 
1975, and the simultaneous massive bombing campaign unleashed by the U.S. Air Force 
during the Second Indochina conflict. Still, the main culprit for the landscape of this 
devastated country peppered with mounds of bodies and mass graves, half-completed 
irrigation projects and a non-existent economy, roads full of trans-migrants and cities 
                                                 
1
 Nayan Chanda, Brother Enemy: The War after the War (New York: Collier Books, 1988) 
2
 The term Khmer Rouge refers to the Communist Party of Kampuchea active since the mid-fifties. Prince 
Sihanouk, head of state between 1954-1970, first coined the phrase. For this research, I will continue using 
this term to designate the Communist organization for the sake of simplicity. During the regime, the Khmer 
Rouge often designated themselves as ‘Angkar’, literally translated to ‘the Organization.’ 
3
 Rosemary H.T. Keohane, ‘Cambodia in the Zero Years: Rudimentary Totalitarianism,’ Third World 
Quarterly, Vol. 14, No.4 (Nov. 1993): 735-748. 
4
 John Pilger, ‘Return to Year Zero’, New Internationalist, issue 242, April 1993. 
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empty of inhabitants was rather the short-lived Khmer Rouge regime, established 
officially between April 17th 1975 and January 9th 1979.5 
The extensive literature documenting and discussing the Khmer Rouge’s rise and 
withdrawal from power is to a great extent preoccupied with the large casualty figures 
resulting from the period, with casualties estimated at around two million Cambodians 
from an initial population of around eight million.6 The enormous scale of devastation 
rapidly captured the focus of international media and academia, which attempted to 
tackle a difficult question: why did this happen? The answer came in different packages, 
depending on the aspect of the Khmer Rouge under scrutiny: the party’s history, its 
ideology, its leaders, its international relations, Cambodia’s historical processes, the 
Indochina War or the perpetrators’ cultural rationalizations, to name a few. 
The first author to describe and denounce the nature of the Khmer Rouge 
revolution was Catholic priest François Ponchaud, who witnessed the forced exodus of 
Phnom Penh in April 1975.7 While other articles and books on the regime were also 
published in the seventies, the almost complete closure of the country to foreigners made 
reliable data collection difficult until the collapse of the regime. Even after the collapse, 
the humanitarian crisis and the civil war continued to pose a challenge to scholars and 
journalists attempting to describe and explain the major events of the regime. 
                                                 
5
 In fact, as most of the countryside was already under Khmer Rouge control from as early as 1972, the date 
of April 17, 1975 refers to the significant and symbolic capitulation of Phnom Penh. As for the date of 
January 9, 1979, it was determined with the establishment of the Vietnamese-backed ‘People’s Republic of 
Cambodia”, although the Khmer Rouge still had de facto control over pockets of territory. 
6
 The statistics of lives lost to starvation, disease and executions ranged from a low 700,000 to as many as 
3.3 million. However, the consensus reached by different methods of calculation hovers at around 2 
million. A significant obstacle to these calculations was the fact that the most recent census on population 
before the Khmer Rouge dated from 1962. 
7
 François Ponchaud, Cambodia Year Zero. London : Allen Lane, 1978. 
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As a result, not including the very political stances on the Cambodian situation, 
several conflicting hypotheses on the nature of the regime coexisted in the eighties. For 
instance, Serge Thion8 described the Khmer Rouge as being unable to control the country 
after their empowerment, while Michael Vickery9 qualified the Khmer Rouge revolution 
as being more peasant-driven than Communist. Ultimately, years of rigorous data 
collection, archival research and in-depth interviews slowly lifted the veil of the elusive 
Khmer Rouge and their disastrous reign.  
The works of historians David Chandler and Ben Kiernan represent the most 
widely-accepted descriptions of the regime. Their seminal books on the Khmer Rouge 
regime – Chandler’s The Tragedy of Cambodian History in 1991, and Kiernan’s The Pol 
Pot Regime in 1996 – debunked several contentious hypotheses and made the reality of 
the Khmer Rouge era more accessible. Those books initially attracted my attention to this 
topic, and their research provided both the basis for this research and the opportunity to 
explore other aspects of the regime. Decades of debates and research on the Khmer 
Rouge apparatus itself yielded a better perspective on the organizations’ leaders and 
followers:  
The prevailing image of the Khmer Rouges as uniformly mindless automatons, 
bent on destruction, was fundamentally wrong. What the deportees themselves 
experienced was a mosaic of idealism and butchery, exaltation and horror, 
compassion and brutality, that defies easy generalisation. That, too, would 
continue throughout the Khmer Rouge years.10 
 
                                                 
8
 Serge Thion. ‘The Cambodian Idea of Revolution,’ in Revolution and it Aftermath in Kampuchea: Eight 
Essays, eds. David Chandler et al. Yale University Southeast Asian Studies: New Haven, Conn. 1983: 10-
33. 
9
 Michael Vickery, Cambodia:1975-1982, Boston: South End Press, 1984. 
10
 Philip Short, 2004, Pol Pot: Anatomy of a Nightmare, Henry Holt and Company: New York: 281. 
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 If students of that period of Cambodian history reached the consensus that a 
regime described as ‘totalitarian’ in fact embedded many inconsistencies in its 
governance, it seems logical that the population under its control was able to display 
forms of behaviour that defy easy generalization as well. A closer look at published 
narratives of survivors of the regime suggests that examples of resourcefulness, deduction 
and decision-making also emerge, weaved between tales of suffering and losses. In many 
cases, Cambodians commenting on their life under Pol Pot often related with some pride 
those daring actions, crucial decisions or insightful observations. Hence, incorporating 
those views is necessary to contribute to a more accurate understanding of the regime. 
Therefore, this research does not attempt to answer why did so many Cambodians die, 
but rather: How did Cambodians adapt to, escape from or manipulate the situation under 
the Khmer Rouge regime between 1975 and 1979?  
 To answer this question concretely calls for the elaboration of a social history of 
this period, which would establish the middle ground between studies of the Democratic 
Kampuchea state and the myriad of individual stories from survivors of the regime. The 
writing of a ‘social history’ in the case of the Khmer Rouge regime requires the delicate 
and difficult balance between the acknowledgement of the severe abnormal restrictions 
enforced by this totalitarian state and the presence of instances of free will and decision-
making. At the same time, another difficulty lies in describing different individual 
experiences without generalizing them or sacrificing the humanity of the survivors. While 
these difficulties are found in the writing of any history, the study of the Khmer Rouge 
regime requires particular caution because of the traumatic experience and extreme 
sufferings endured by Cambodians of the time.   
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 While this thesis does not aim to write a social history of the period, I intend to 
pave the way for such an endeavor by studying this period from a perspective that 
emphasizes the Khmer Rouge regime as a state-society relationship within certain 
parameters. More precisely, I juxtapose the mechanisms employed by the Khmer Rouge 
to enforce ideologically inspired policies with the various ways in which Cambodians 
responded to the concrete implications of such policies. In doing so, I attempt to grasp the 
space where Cambodians chose distinctly divergent options in their responses to the 
violence of the regime. For instance, the proliferation of black markets illustrated how 
individual needs and resourcefulness nullified the strict Khmer Rouge policies of 
eliminating private property and any form of economy.  
 
Methodology and Sources 
 
 In order to unearth important patterns, I compiled 129 interviews of Cambodian 
survivors from various sources: translated interviews from the Documentation Center of 
Cambodia (DC-Cam), published autobiographies by Cambodian readers of the DC-Cam-
based magazine Searching for the Truth and other published biographies. I carefully read 
through these interviews and identified recurrent themes occurring throughout the 
country during this period.  I then regrouped related patterns of behavior into five 
different sections: 
 
1-Joining the Khmer Rouge apparatus  
2-Cooperating with the authorities and obeying the rules of the regime  
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3-Disobeying/confronting those rules  
4-Escaping from the control of the Khmer Rouge within or outside the country  
5-Negotiating assets and skills in the parallel black market 
 
These categories were not definite nor mutually exclusive: they merely serve to 
formulate and emphasize the differences in the actions and decisions taken by 
Cambodians during the Khmer Rouge period. Some of those actions could and did 
coexist at the same time, and Cambodians often had little time or information to react to 
drastic changes in their lives. In the context of the abnormal social relations of this 
period, when former social status, identity, relationships and possessions were brutally 
disrupted under the latent threat (and execution) of violence, the paramount 
preoccupation was survival. 
 The main source of stories was the Documentation Center of Cambodia, an 
archive established by Yale University in 1994 and located in Phnom Penh. From the 129 
stories, 88 were collected from this source. They were selected on the basis of available 
English translations, and correspond to most of the interviews published during the eight 
years of existence of the English edition of Svèng Rok Kapit: Searching for the Truth. In 
order to be selected for this thesis, the interviews or biographies had to be at least two 
pages in length, as the shorter ones did not provide sufficient information, and also 
referred to the story or episode of a single individual. I avoided another possible source in 
the translated interrogation files from prisoners of S-21.11 These documents presented 
                                                 
11
 The term ‘S-21’ refers to the infamous highest level of security prison located in a former high school in 
Phnom Penh and also known as ‘Tuol Sleng.’ 
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detailed aspects of each victim’s story, but the method of interrogation under torture and 
threat of execution seriously undermines the validity of the stories  
 The documentation center represents the only archive for the Khmer Rouge 
regime and stores thousands of interviews conducted by either their staff or previous 
researchers. They subsequently selected a few of these articles for their monthly 
publication, Searching for the Truth, established in 2000. From the 88 stories from DC-
Cam, the majority (63) was provided through interviews conducted by their staff. They 
compiled these interviews with an open-ended question asking the respondents to explain 
their lives during Democratic Kampuchea.12 Such methodology often yielded unexpected 
insights and allowed a broader scope of research than leading and precise questions. The 
background of the interviewed survivors also offered the most variation from any other 
source: several former Khmer Rouge personnel and Cambodians from all the different 
provinces were interviewed; hence, an overview of the data presented a complete picture 
from different sections of society. The editor of Searching for the Truth, Youk Chhang, 
also gracefully accepted to publish letters from survivors sent to the center, thus 
providing valuable primary sources. In contrast to interviews, the latter did not require 
the interpretation of an interviewer. These autobiographies represented the rest of the 
stories obtained from DC-Cam (25). 
 DC-Cam, founded by Yale University, thus promotes a perspective emphasizing 
on the individual role played by the leaders of the Khmer Rouge movement for the 
                                                 
12
 ‘All interviews are structured to begin with very general questions, such as “what happened to you before 
and during the Pol Pot time?”  The DC-Cam field research policy is based firmly upon experience that has 
demonstrated the importance of avoiding leading questions. We seek to uncover individual responsibility 
and command responsibility for genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and the first elements of 
these crimes are revealed in the survivors’ stories.  Our interview methodology attempts to penetrate every 
possible detail that an interviewee can remember concerning what that person observed in the locale where 
they were situated during the DK regime.’ Excerpt from DC-Cam’s Annual Report 2000. 
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unfolding of the Cambodian genocide, and the necessity to bring these leaders to an 
international court of justice. This explicit goal of pursuing justice in an international 
court to prosecute the main leaders of the Khmer Rouge plausibly affected the collection 
of interviews by its researchers. While this agenda did not seem to directly affect the 
content of the interviews, the stories often ended with a somewhat superimposed 
endorsement of international justice from the interviewees. However, the interviewers did 
not elaborate on the nature of this endorsement, as survivors of the regime seem to 
disagree on how justice should be (or should have been) pursued.  
 Furthermore, DC-Cam has also assumed the responsibility for museums 
commemorating the genocide like Tuol Sleng and the Choeung Ek site outside Phnom 
Penh. While DC-Cam has been very active in providing a voice for Cambodians and 
facilitating research on the Khmer Rouge for jurists and scholars, it is debatable to what 
extent alternative perspectives or dissonant voices could co-exist within this established 
framework. 
 In order to avoid an over-reliance on this sole source, I used biographies and 
compilations of interviews of Cambodian refugees published in the United States or 
France. Those biographies provided the remaining 39 stories. Furthermore, their authors’ 
new cultural context compelled them to articulate Cambodian cultural meanings behind 
some situations for a Western audience. 
However, these biographies overrepresented certain sections of Cambodian 
society. In the biographies published in the United States for instance, the majority of 
interviewees came from middle-class urban families, while this group actually 
represented a minority of the population of Cambodia at the time. Furthermore, refugees 
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accepted in the United States were typically registered from the Khao-I-Dang refugee 
camp in Thailand.13 This fact resulted in a geographic bias, since most of these refugees 
came from the nearby province of Battambang, leaving other provinces of Cambodia 
underrepresented. Most importantly, the stories selected for publication had to correspond 
to certain objectives of the publisher. In the United States, many publishers selected 
stories for their ‘emotional appeal’, thus overwhelmingly published stories from 
Cambodians who were only children during the regime.14 This bias had the adverse effect 
of propagating the belief that Cambodians during the regime were helpless or unaware of 
the events surrounding them. 
 Finally, the published biographies from France were important in developing the 
ideas set forth with this thesis. Unlike most of their compatriots in America, some of 
these Cambodians previously completed their higher education in France, often in 
technical fields like engineering. With this background, they had a different perspective 
on events and provided some articulate opinions about their experiences. French 
publishers also presented stories of these older men engaging the Khmer Rouge with their 
insights and knowledge. Therefore, these sources could lead to the opposite 
misrepresentation of generalizing the ability to outmaneuver the Khmer Rouge. While 
this represents another bias, such detailed stories offer other valuable insights into an 
underrepresented section of the Cambodian population, hence contributed to the 
articulation of this thesis. 
 
 
                                                 
13
 William Shawcross, The Quality of Mercy, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), 5. 
14
 From David Chandler’s Preface to Hour Chea, Quatre Ans avec les Khmer Rouges, (Paris: Tchou, 2007). 
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Research Limitations  
 
Beside the limitations from its sources, this research also has methodological 
limitations. First of all, the sample size of 129 interviews, while detailed, remains rather 
small to effectively represent the Cambodian population of that period. Furthermore, 
these interviews were selected on the basis of their availability, mostly from the DC-
Cam, thus do not represent a truly random sample. A larger random sample from the 
complete set of interviews would be necessary to significantly generalize the proportion 
of responses.  
Although this research respects and values the accounts of every Cambodian, the 
respondents also had their own limitations. A few stories could have self-serving 
agendas, like in cases of former Khmer Rouge soldiers attempting to polish unpleasant 
details from their past employment. In other cases, and perhaps less obviously, the 
survivors could have altered the version of their story, either consciously or 
unconsciously, as a coping mechanism for the terror of the regime.  
Also, the amount of time between the end of the regime and the actual interview 
might have varied their perception of the regime, possibly from failing memory. More 
generally, their perceptions were likely informed with decades of propaganda and rumors 
about the Khmer Rouge government. For example, many interviewees in the United 
States consistently referred to the Khmer Rouge soldiers as “Pol Pots”, responding to the 
mainstream allocation of responsibility to the leader. Ironically, during most of the 
regime, these rank-and-file soldiers ignored the existence of ‘Pol Pot.’  
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The control of information and movement during the regime prevented anyone – 
arguably even the leaders of the country – from knowing what was happening nationally, 
both from the inside and the outside. In fact, the compilation of stories and documents 
from as many survivors as possible is the only way to form a precise picture of events 
during the regime.  
Due to language restrictions, I am only able to access English or French sources 
and access to the more extensive primary Khmer sources was not possible. Translated 
materials consequently have their setbacks, particularly when these languages have such 
different roots. It is still possible to gather the primary meaning from these cases, but 
more subtle expressions and multiple meanings are likely to be lost in translation. 
Alexander Hinton’s recent anthropological study of the genocide provides ample 
evidence for the wealth of information contained in Khmer words in their original 
cultural contexts.  
Furthermore, there is no official transliteration of Khmer written words from its 
original alphabet to any Western language, which implies that the same word or even a 
person’s name can be written quite differently. Unlike many languages in the same 
region, spoken Khmer is not a tonal language, but it utilizes complex sounds that are 
difficultly translated in another script. Furthermore, the same word can be pronounced 
differently within Cambodia due to regional accents and the fact that two different 
alphabets, an ‘official’ and a ‘rural,’ coexist. The Khmer words used in this thesis are 
simply copied from its sources, and the same word is consistently written the same way. 
A peculiar problem in the study of mass murder is the fact that the interviewees 
were only the survivors of the Khmer Rouge, hence data about a substantial proportion of 
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the population, the casualties, will never be collected. In this case, the casualties are 
estimated to represent as many as 20 percent of the population. Furthermore, if is still 
difficult for Cambodians who lived through the regime to fathom the extent of the 
tragedy, it is almost impossible for any outsider to simply imagine its magnitude.  
Finally, although I took note of the gender of the interviewee or the author of the 
story, I did not include an analysis of the effect of gender on the experiences of the 
survivors. This omission does not imply that gender is not a significant variable; on the 
contrary, a gender-based analysis would require a study on its own, particularly in a 
hierarchical and ‘conservative’ society like Cambodia. Regardless of the cultural 
background, men and women in any conflict or massacre are treated distinctively. For 
instance, men tend to be executed for fear of retaliation, while women, if less targeted for 
execution, are often victims of various sexual assault. In that sense, the Khmer Rouge era 
was no exception, and a further research on gender based on this framework would duly 
anticipate different perceptions and reactions to the regime whether the survivor is male 
or female. 
 
Decisions and Parameters 
 
 The starting point of this research is the acknowledgement of a space for 
individual choices for Cambodians during the Khmer Rouge rule. Is this stretching the 
concept of agency too far? While I believe that advancing an argument reclaiming the 
role of society in this repressive regime is mostly appropriate and feasible, some 
parameters need to be set in place in order to avoid misleading implications.  
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 The basic premise is that Cambodians were not merely passive during the three 
years of the Khmer Rouge regime. A broad survey of survivors’ accounts would suffice 
to prove this point. If we take a group of Cambodians who had to survive the same ordeal 
at the same time, we can locate the differences in their thoughts about the situation and 
subsequent actions. Therefore, being able to perform different actions in a similarly 
repressive situation shows the existence of minimal room for decision-making.  
A good example can be found in Ysa Osman’s The Cham Rebellion. In the first 
part of his book, the author lists different interviews of Cham villagers who went through 
the same ordeal at the beginning of Democratic Kampuchea. Indeed, those Khmer Rouge 
survivors were all arrested without having committed a crime and were sent for 
interrogation at the Kroch Chhmar prison headquarters in Kampong Cham. Despite the 
extent of the coercion, these villagers all reacted differently: a prisoner disobeyed the 
rules set by the Khmer Rouge in defiance, another decided to lie during his interrogation 
to avoid torture and advised his fellow prisoners to use the same tactic, yet another 
decided to stick to the truth and claim his innocence, and the last one attempted to escape 
twice during his arrest.15 Those differences illustrate variation even in the most restrictive 
situation. From this example, we can infer that Cambodians living outside the prison 
system had more freedoms in their decision-making. 
Asserting the agency of the subjects of a repressive regime is not tantamount to 
displacing the responsibility for their fate from the hands of the guards and soldiers into 
their own. In order to avoid any implication of blaming the victim, this research only 
looks at which decision was taken and on which premise, without systematically referring 
                                                 
15
 El Him’s story, from Osman Ysa, The Cham Rebellion: Survivor’s Stories from the Villages, (Phnom 
Penh: Documentation Centre of Cambodia, 2006) 24-44. 
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to the outcome of that particular decision. Avoiding the allocation of blame and 
responsibility is intended to prevent passing undue judgment on individuals.  
Besides being unethical, linking decisions to outcomes could also be misleading. 
Some person’s salvation often proved to be another’s demise. For example, the decision 
to undertake the dangerous Thai border crossing cost the lives of many Cambodians, but 
it also became the only way for some of them to survive. While some conditions could 
explain those different outcomes, according to many survivors themselves, the 
determining factor for survival was mostly: luck. Indeed, this un-quantifiable variable 
appeared in almost all the survivors’ accounts to explain why they survived a particular 
event, while many others perished. In short, this research does not intend to develop into 
a problematic ‘survival guide to the Khmer Rouge.’ 
It is also important to avoid the other extreme of romanticizing the range of 
possibilities available in that period. Some survivors’ stories relate complex strategies to 
deceive the Khmer Rouge, others offer gripping tales from escape-artists and a few 
describe courageous instances of resistance as freedom fighters. Despite the interest 
generated by such stories, these examples are exceptions rather than the rule, as most 
actions were much more ‘modest’ in nature. There might also be a bias towards such 
stories in published accounts. Many biographies and movies about the Khmer Rouge are 
focused on a story centered on some ‘heroism’ and may be more appealing in contrast to 
the grisly world of such human tragedies. Hence, the set of publications available on the 
market sometimes offers an unrepresentative sample of the reality of the Democratic 
Kampuchea by overplaying the actual decision-making capacity available to most 
Cambodians. 
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Bearing in mind these limitations, this study proposes a context-sensitive 
definition of ‘decision-making’. The living conditions will be detailed further in the 
course of this thesis, but generally, we can describe Democratic Kampuchea as a 
totalitarian regime relying on extensive coercion based on deception rather than an 
explicit rule-of-law, in which society was forced to work in different collectivized 
economic units mostly related to agricultural production divided on the basis of previous 
social class and current age-group. The coercive nature of the state was often concretized 
in large-scale executions planned by the higher echelons of the Communist Party of 
Kampuchea, although there were many references to personally motivated executions 
ordered by local authorities or spontaneous decisions by Khmer Rouge soldiers and 
guards. In addition, death often came as a result of unchecked diseases, famine and 




 Instead of dedicating a separate chapter for the literature review and the overview 
of the regime, I incorporate a specific section of both in each chapter. This division is 
aimed  at providing the contextual parameters most likely to influence certain actions and 
decisions.. For instance, I link the Khmer Rouge evacuation and relocation policies with 
escape (Chapter 5), and its policies on the economy (i.e. destruction of currency, market, 
prohibition of private ownership) with the creation of an extensive parallel black market 
(Chapter 6). This association aims to represent the contrast between intended and brutally 
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implemented policies, and the actual situation emanating from individual decision-
making. 
 Furthermore, the attention of previous literature has been unevenly geared toward 
certain issues, like the empowerment of the Khmer Rouge and sometimes resistance, 
while others have rarely been studied, like the black market and the use of skills during 
the Khmer Rouge. The chapters are ordered to follow the most common and arguably 
predictable responses, starting with joining the Khmer Rouge and cooperation, to the less 
common responses based primarily on the data compiled for this research, namely escape 
and the black market. 
 The second chapter (Chapter 2) examines the processes of recruitment for those 
who joined the military and administrative branches of the Khmer Rouge (which were 
closely intertwined). The chapter begins with a brief history of the Communist 
revolutionary movement in Cambodia, then continues with the five years preceding the 
Khmer Rouge capture of Phnom Penh, when most of the recruitment occurred. 
Establishing the motives for joining the Khmer Rouge is necessary to appreciate the 
differences of objectives within the seemingly monolithic entity of the totalitarian state. 
The different expectations from mostly poor rural Cambodians enrolled in the ranks of 
the Khmer Rouge can help to explain the disparity of motives witnessed during the 
regime itself. Those differences in motives in turn allowed for variations in interactions 
between representatives of the state and members of society that will be discussed more 
at length in the following chapters.  
 The next chapter (Chapter 3) examines the most common reaction to the 
repression enforced by the Khmer Rouge: cooperation. While this category appears like a 
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euphemism for passivity, some important clarifications justify interpreting some forms of 
compliance as an active process for dealing with the harsh reality of the regime. This 
omnipresent compliance resulted from the recognition of the threat that the Khmer Rouge 
were posing to the lives of their subjects despite the deceptive information disseminated 
through propaganda. In some cases, cooperation meant a performance to appear as more 
acceptable under the new revolutionary hierarchy. This chapter attempts to highlight 
nuances in seemingly straightforward binaries based on identity and in the prevailing 
expected reaction to the regime’s cruelty. 
 Apparently antithetical to compliance were different forms of resistance (Chapter 
4). The main reason behind disobedience was the ongoing food crisis triggered by ill-
advised or faultily implemented economic policies on agriculture. At the individual level, 
the necessity to gain more food for personal survival triggered numerous instances of 
infringement of rules. On a larger scale, other motives played an important role in more 
violent instances of resistance such as assassination plots, confrontations, revolts and 
rebellions. However, while those spontaneous outbursts of violence seem relatively 
frequent, they had little impact on the conduct of the regime, despite overwhelming 
dissatisfaction against it. 
 The previous behaviors indicated some form of interaction with the ruling forces, 
yet in the minds of some Cambodians, were not sufficient to assure safety against the 
Khmer Rouge. Hence came the decision to escape the regime altogether (Chapter 5). 
Considering the prohibition of internal movement and the reinforcing of border 
surveillance, attempting to escape to neighboring countries was a risky and costly 
endeavor. Internal displacement, as defined by taking refuge in natural shelters or other 
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villages in Cambodia, was substantially more common, particularly in cases when 
executions appeared imminent. Often seeking refuge in a neighboring village or work 
camp under the protection of the local village chief was sufficient to provide a shelter 
until the end of the regime.  
 The last chapter (Chapter 6) evaluates the interactions between the new people, 
base people and the Khmer Rouge that occurred as a result of local trade and barter. 
Contrary to Democratic Kampuchea’s ideals of asceticism and anti-materialism, base 
people and lower-level cadre still harbored desires for previously unattainable goods. 
These goods were within their reach by trading with new people who had hidden their 
valuables and now needed to improve their subsistence. Simultaneously, some Khmer 
Rouge cadres found private benefits in utilizing the skills of new people who would 
otherwise face harsh discrimination. These interactions partially invalidated the rigid 
segregation of classes and officially-enforced hatred propaganda separating the base 










Chapter 2-Enter the Khmer Rouge 
  
 While the empowerment of the Khmer Rouge in 1975 might have appeared as a 
rather sudden development for some, the origins of communism in Cambodia can be 
traced back to at least forty years before the establishment of the regime.16 This chapter 
will begin with a brief overview of the creation and expansion of the Communist Party of 
Kampuchea from the thirties onward. From being a marginal yet growing political 
movement, the Khmer Rouge gained a dramatic momentum after the 1970 coup by Lon 
Nol and Sirik Matak.17  
 Although the term ‘Angkar’ referred to a single organization embodying the 
‘State’ in Cambodia, when the organization formed the government between 1975-1979, 
its members had divergent and sometimes conflicting ideals.. Many Khmer Rouge 
soldiers shared similar social backgrounds, but they had many divergent reasons for 
enlisting; from these differences, veterans, soldiers and militia of the Khmer Rouge also 
had different expectations from the government once it gained power. Even if they had 
worked together under the same banner before 1975, their divergent viewpoints created 
tensions within the ranks of the Khmer Rouge. A reflection on the nature of this 
organization is necessary for the purpose of this thesis since those who supported the 
regime and enforced its policies consequently affected the lives of Cambodians during 
the Democratic Kampuchea period. 
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 Therefore, the following section of this chapter addresses the different motives for 
joining and the Khmer Rouge efforts for recruitment. The sheer increase of Khmer Rouge 
combatants over only a few years bears witness to the popularity of the movement and 
possibly the effectiveness of the recruitment strategies deployed to entice rural 
Cambodians to join their ranks.18 The time frame under scrutiny for that period precedes 
the focus of this thesis, since very few Cambodians joined the Khmer Rouge during the 
Democratic Kampuchea period.  
 
Who were the Khmer Rouge? 
 
 The history of communism in Cambodia can be traced back many decades before 
the Khmer Rouge regime. In the twenties and thirties, the Vietnamese were  largely 
responsible for the beginning of this ideological movement in Indochina. The first 
reported incidents involving Communists in Cambodia occurred in 1929 with the arrests 
of several militants of Vietnamese origin.19 The next year,  the Vietnamese Communist 
Party changed its name to the ‘Indo-China Communist Party’ (ICP) during a conference 
in Hong Kong to represent the broader reach of its anti-colonial struggle, yet no Khmer 
representative was present.20 The involvement of the ICP in Cambodia began with its 
support for anti-French nationalist Khmers, the Khmer Issarak, from 1945 onward, but 
few Khmers changed sides to join the ICP.21  
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In 1950, with the advent of a pro-Western government in Thailand, resistance to 
Vietnamese help from the Issaraks and changing Vietnamese strategies in their war 
against the French, General Vo Nguyen Giap called for the ‘active construction of 
independent Lao and Kampuchean armies’ and ‘the creation of a broad political base.’22 
After about twenty years of symbolic ‘Indochinese’ involvement, Cambodian and 
Laotian participation in Communist struggle finally concretized, as the ICP approved the 
creation of the Vietnamese Workers’ Party (VWP) and the autonomous Cambodian 
branch, the People’s Revolutionary Party of Khmerland (PRPK) was created with Son 
Ngoc Minh as its first leader.23 
In the meantime, the struggle for Cambodian independence continued both on the 
battlefield and politically. On the ground, Issarak forces gained modest victories against 
the French, and while the scale of the conflict was much smaller than in Vietnam, the 
violence and intensity of the fighting should not be underestimated.24 Philip Short, for 
instance, describes how the Issarak assassinated French supporters and burnt down 
villages in reprisal, how colonial troops also burnt villages and raped women, and how 
the ‘Khmer Viet Minh’ brutally executed those expected to be traitors.25  
In the capital, the French authorities tried to assuage claims for independence by 
granting Cambodia the status of an ‘Associate State in the French Union’ in 1950.26 
Concretely, the French gave full autonomy on ‘Local Subjects as Press and Information 
and Local Budget, Labour Services, Tourist Office,’27 while maintaining power in the 
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remaining vital ministries. In the 1951 elections, the Democratic Party, proponents of full 
independence and opponents of conservative politicians (hence Sihanouk), won 54 seats 
from 78.28 This electoral defeat for Sihanouk and the acclaimed return of Cambodian 
nationalist Son Ngoc Thanh from imprisonment in France pushed King Norodom 
Sihanouk to take drastic measures to secure power in Cambodia the next year. With the 
support of French troops, Sihanouk gained power in a bloodless coup and replaced the 
elected Democrat cabinet with his own supporters.29 Having entered the political stage, 
the King declared a ‘Royal Crusade for Independence’ (which David Chandler qualified 
as a ‘political carte blanche that Sihanouk issued to himself’) which demanded full 
independence from the French, much to the latter’s dismay. After the French military 
defeat in the hands of the Viet Minh in 1954, Cambodia was thus well positioned to 
negotiate its independence at the Geneva Conference. 
In the subsequent period of independence, the Khmer Issarak movement 
dissolved, since its leaders considered their objective to be attained. Some Communist 
members also shared this sentiment, and they decided to leave the movement with the 
belief that their class struggle ended with the departure of the French. Around a thousand 
Issaraks, many of them Communists, followed the Vietminh back into Vietnam, and 
Hanoi became an important training center for Cambodian Communists.30 The remaining 
Cambodian Communists created a political party, the Pracheachon, to compete for 
elections, but initially failed as the Sangkum intimidated most candidates out of the 
election.31 After this defeat, the Pracheachon Party leader Sieu Heng was also discovered 
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to be a government informant. From this point onward, the KPRP entered a dormant 
stage and membership dwindled from 850 after independence to 250 a few years later. 
In addition to this reduction of their struggle, Sihanouk further marginalized the 
remaining Communists with arrests and exclusion from the political process; hence, 
many of the veterans took refuge in the jungle or the countryside during the fifties and 
sixties. According to Kiernan, this separation of the various veteran members and the 
departure of many veteran Communist members to Hanoi provided an opportunity for a 
previously unknown man to climb ranks in his role as the liaison officer remaining in 
Phnom Penh; this man, Saloth Sar, eventually became the leader of the organization in 
1962, and the vanguard of the party accordingly shifted around the same time.32 
This shift in leadership had important implications for the future of Cambodia. 
Before elaborating in the dramatic rise of this party to power, we shall first examine the 
background of these new leaders. The main figure of the party, Saloth Sar, was born in a 
middle-class family in Kampong Thom province. In addition to this relatively well-off 
origin, his cousin was one of the concubines of King Sisowath Monivong. As a result, the 
future Pol Pot was able to receive his primary schooling from a Catholic school in Phnom 
Penh, his high school at a public school in Kampong Cham, and his higher education at 
Russey Keo Technical School as a carpenter.33 The quality of his education was quite 
unrepresentative of the experience of the majority of Cambodians during the twenties and 
thirties, when formal education was beyond the reach of almost all Cambodians as even 
Norodom Sihanouk had studied in Saigon.34 More importantly, Saloth Sar pursued his 
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education in France. Despite his failure in securing any degree, he nonetheless made 
important contacts as a member of the Parti Communiste Français.35 
In fact, other important members of the new vanguard of the sixties shared his 
middle-class rural origins and French education. Ieng Sary, for instance, was born in a 
middle-class family in Travinh (Southern Vietnam, formerly Cochinchina) and pursued 
his education in France.36 Sary and Sar’s future wives, the Khieu sisters, Thirith and 
Ponnary,also studied in France and came from a relatively higher social standing, as their 
father was a judge in the city of Battambang. Khieu Thirith and Khieu Ponnary also hold 
important positions during Democratic Kampuchea. Other  high-profile leaders like 
Khieu Samphan, Hou Yuon and Hu Nim all completed their doctorates in Economics in 
France (submitted respectively in 1959, 1955 and 1965).37 Hence similar middle to 
upper-middle class background and French education seemed to be common factors for 
this group of leaders behind the policies of the Khmer Rouge.  
Other important figures in the movement, like Hu Nim and Hou Yuon, came from 
more modest backgrounds. They grew up in small landowning families and pursued their 
education in Cambodian high schools before becoming teachers.38 Yet, their different 
origin from the Pol Pot clique may have been a factor for their execution in S-21 as early 
as 1975. Another important leader took another route to prominence; Long Rech (aka 
Nuon Chea) completed his education at Thammasat University in Bangkok and enrolled 
in the Thai Communist Party.39 Despite these few exceptions, the leaders of the regime 
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mostly shared a similar background, as an educated middle-class frustrated with the lack 
of opportunities in the corrupt political system.  
From a compilation of DC-Cam interviews and biographic cases, the leaders’ 
social background different greatly from that of the followers who joined after 1970. 
According to my research, almost all of the interviewees came from a rural background, 
most of whom from either poor or lower class (25 out of 31). In Cambodia, their 
economic status can be determined by their family’s ownership of property: the most 
destitute peasants did not own any land, had irregular employment, debts, and sometimes 
their family members had to be separated. For example, young boys were sent in temples 
to attain at least basic education and receive some food and shelter. Lower-class rural 
Cambodians typically owned at least a small parcel of land with a few fruit trees and a 
few farm animals like pigs and chickens, if not a few buffaloes. Those humble origins 
impacted their reasons to join the Khmer Rouge. Unlike the Khmer Rouge leaders, they 
did not have the luxury of aspiring for a better social situation, but rather struggled to 
maintain basic subsistence level and employment.40  
In relation to their socio-economic status, the level of education from these 
Khmer Rouge soldiers was very low, if it existed at all. Even in times of peace, their 
education had often to be ceased from a lack of money to pay for basic courses or the 
need to help their families in producing income. As noted earlier, many boys acquired 
basic literacy level in pagodas, but this type of religious education was not an option for 
young Khmer girls. While the peasants’ lack of education may have rendered them 
particularly vulnerable to Khmer Rouge propaganda, this lack of education did not 
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necessarily make the poorer peasants less aware of their reasons for joining and the 
implications of such choices.  
Many accounts revealed that the ongoing civil war of the early seventies 
exacerbated the problem of education. Many teachers had taken refuge into cities to avoid 
the fighting, and as a result, even children who could otherwise pursue an education were 
not able to do so. The Khmer Rouge army not only offered military training, but also 
political and technical training. Part of the appeal for joining the Khmer Rouge were 
those opportunities of achieving a better career than those otherwise available for these 
lower-class Cambodians. As a young female Khmer Rouge, Ming Thoeun joined the 
revolution after dropping out of school because of the bombings; since the situation in her 
village was dangerous, some Khmer Rouge subsequently came to recruit new soldiers.41 
Finally, beside class and education, the age difference between leaders and 
soldiers in the regime could be termed as a generational gap. As discussed earlier, the 
Khmer Rouge leaders received their education in the forties and fifties, and pursued 
careers before their armed struggle. In 1975, for instance, Pol Pot was 50 years old, 
Khieu Samphan, 46, and Khieu Ponnary, 55.42  In contrast, Henri Locard describes 
Khmer Rouge soldiers, perhaps too generally, as ‘children or ignorant adolescents.’43 
The above comparisons between the leadership and the followers of the Khmer 
Rouge reveal two important aspects of the organization. First, the differences between 
these leaders and followers were quite significant. The leaders generally came from at 
least middle-class rural background, enjoyed substantial education,  often from abroad, 
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and were in their forties during the struggle. On the other hand, their followers tended to 
come from humble rural origins, may not have accessed any education and were mostly 
much younger. Second, each group, leaders and soldiers, seemed particularly 
homogenous within itself. Such comparisons were only possible considering that, with a 
few exceptions, they had distinctly similar experiences, hence making it possible to 
generalize their backgrounds. However, despite their shared experiences, the followers 
who joined the Khmer Rouge during the seventies did not share the same motives.  
 
Recruitment and Motives 
 
 After two rather quiet decades, the political situation in Cambodia after 1970 and 
the spillover effects of the neighboring Vietnamese conflict gave new life to the 
previously dwindling CPK.44 In merely five years, the revolutionary army was in a 
position to successfully overrun the official government in a complete victory. Even 
before this victory, the Khmer Rouge had made such advances that only the massive 
bombing campaign unleashed by the Americans seemed to be able to delay the almost 
inevitable Khmer Rouge victory.45 A  factor for the success of the Khmer Rouge was 
their effective recruitment efforts that allowed them to entice or coerce rural Cambodians 
into swelling their ranks. According to Kiernan, in merely two years, ‘the Khmer 
Communist regular and guerilla forces totaled two hundred thousand troops and were still 
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expanding. (The Lon Nol army was only slightly larger).’46 Parallel to Khmer Rouge 
recruitment, voluntary recruitment in the Republican army was nonetheless impressive as 
well, Kiernan notes that within the first year of the regime, the army grew from 35,000 
troops to around 150,000.47 
 From the surveyed interviews, the Khmer Rouge benefited from voluntary 
involvement, persuasion and coercion to increase the size of its army. The reason for the 
recruitment also influenced the experience and perspective of the young Khmer Rouge 
soldiers. For example, the soldiers who joined after believing Khmer Rouge propaganda, 
and even more so those coerced into joining, were more likely to feel disillusioned and 
often either attempted to desert the Khmer Rouge or participate in resistance against the 
government.  
  A large array of heteroclite motives often overlapped  in the minds of the young 
Khmer Rouge, even if they did not state them in their interviews or biographies. An 
example of the difficulty to distinguish voluntary and persuaded involvement was 
represented in the testimony of Mak Tork. As a youth of twelve at the time of his 
recruitment, he iterated that ‘No one forced me to do so, I did it voluntarily. Like other 
people, we wanted the King to return.’48 Yet he also stated later that his parents 
encouraged him to join and that the village chief propagandized for the liberation of the 
country from the Lon Nol regime. Since it is clear that the most important authority 
figures convinced this youth to join the Khmer Rouge, it is doubtful to what degree was 
his decision ‘voluntary’.  
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 As soon as Prince Sihanouk was deposed, many Cambodians protested in Phnom 
Penh against the Lon Nol regime, and the police subsequently shot at thousands of 
protesters.49 These constituted the first wave of volunteers to join the Khmer Rouge in the 
jungle. This feeling of hatred continued to swell during the civil war, in correlation with 
the level of corruption in the government and the instances of brutal policies enforced by 
Lon Nol officers.50 Phe Phai Pheap, former Khmer Rouge soldier, gave his reason for 
joining: ‘He reasoned that his commitment to the Khmer Rouge stemmed from his 
painful anger toward the Lon Nol soldiers who had shot and killed a number of 
demonstrators who were protesting the coup d’état against King Norodom Sihanouk.’51  
 A crucial point noted from all the cases was the absence of an  important motive: 
belief in communism. In fact, beside the educated elite already members of the CPK, 
subsequent Cambodians joining the Khmer Rouge never referred to their faith in 
Communist ideology as a motive. There could be two reasons for this absence. As listed 
above, many motives cited were unrelated to ideological struggle, and the presence of the 
Khmer Rouge as the sole fighting force allegedly for the King and against Lon Nol and 
the Americans proved a powerful motivator. On the other hand, the Khmer Rouge regime 
and its association with communism became obviously compromised since its 1979 
defeat in the hands of the Vietnamese, and it was in the interest of the previous supporters 
of the regime to downplay their participation in the tragedy, thus their previous 
ideological commitment. In short, the behavior of Khmer Rouge soldiers cannot be 
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generalized from an assumed commitment in communism neither should the ideological 
importance of the indoctrination be overlooked despite the lack of mention in the 
soldiers’ autobiographies. 
 The Khmer Rouge also welcomed former Issarak rebels who joined them in their 
struggle. With their previous collaboration in the independence struggle, these former 
Issarak were not only welcomed, but the Khmer Rouge also accepted some in high 
positions within their party. For instance, Mat Ly, a former Muslim Cham Issarak rebel, 
was nominated to be the leader of the Eastern Zone in 1970, an important position.52  
 Joining the revolution was also a manifestation of Cambodian nationalism. 
Besides having illegally overthrown Prince Sihanouk, Lon Nol was clearly perceived as 
an ally (at best) of the Americans. Furthermore, the direct interventions in Cambodia by 
American forces in either invasions or extensive bombings, despite their alliance with the 
Lon Nol government, reinforced the latter’s image as a puppet in foreign hands. Several 
revolutionaries thus perceived the Khmer Rouge as a national force fighting for the 
liberation of their country against a foreign-backed usurping regime.  
 This perspective was particularly important for overseas Cambodians. Hour Chea 
recalled that in France, where most of the overseas Cambodians were pursuing their 
higher education, there were initially three political groups: the pro-government, the 
leftist and the centrist groups.53 With the unfolding events in Cambodia in the early 
seventies, most members of the centrist group joined the pro-Communist organization, as 
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did Hour Chea himself.54 He specified that his reasons were his patriotism for Cambodia 
and his faith in Prince Sihanouk’s exiled government in Beijing. Following his belief, he 
returned in Cambodia in 1976, but was eventually distressed by the new face of his 
transformed country.  
 Considering the targets for recruitment were mostly male teenagers, some of the 
recruits’ rationale for joining was informed by their juvenile desires. More precisely, a 
recurring reason for joining the Khmer Rouge was the wish for many of those youths to 
simply own a gun and be involved in fighting. Thus, instead of being fearful of facing 
enemy fire, some youths rather imagined their heroic involvement in battle. However, not 
surprisingly, most were quite disappointed with the harsh reality of war, but when they 
came to realize the danger that they had willingly encountered, it was already too late to 
withdraw. Sen Yen, for example, volunteered into the Khmer Rouge without telling his 
parents: ‘[He] used to think that fighting was fun, but later realized that earning his living 
with combs and scissors is better than holding a gun.’55 
 Earning the right to bear arms under the Khmer Rouge provided clear benefits as 
well. Meng-Try Ea and Sorya Sim mention the importance of gaining respect vis-à-vis 
other children and villager for the youth who decided to join the Khmer Rouge.56 
Furthermore, they add that militia or soldiers did not have to toil in the fields like other 
youths of their age and they also received larger daily rations. The immediate tangible 
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benefits and the abstract notion of respect both helped young Cambodians to join the 
Khmer Rouge forces.  
 Finally, the last reason for joining voluntarily the Khmer Rouge and, according to 
Ben Kiernan and William Shawcross, the most significant one, was the extensive 
American bombings of the countryside. While this campaign had been started in 1969, it 
reached its climax in spring 1973, and subsequently dramatically increased the ranks of 
the revolutionary party.57 Geographically, even if the Vietnamese Communists were 
concentrated on the two easternmost provinces of Cambodia, the bombing campaign 
covered the whole country as far as the Thai border. Every village or pocket of 
population was targeted, in some cases several times. These bombings had an immense 
effect on Cambodians who felt powerless in defending themselves against this threat 
from above. From their anger and desire for revenge, many decided to join the Khmer 
Rouge. Without intending to minimize the importance of this explanation, I argue that the 
actual range of motives for the growth of the Khmer Rouge was much broader.. 
The Khmer Rouge did not simply wait for Cambodians to volunteer in joining 
them. In fact, they spent a lot of energy and resources in trying to convince people to join 
their cause. Generally, the structure of the CPK, even before their victory, replicated the 
structure of the state. As a result, there were provincial, district and sub-district leaders. 
The most notable difference, however, was their creation of various Zones, each 
incorporating a few provinces and each requiring its own leader. 58 At the local level, the 
village chief assumed the same traditional functions, with two important distinctions: 
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first, he now had to be a member of the Khmer Rouge, thus had more authority with less 
autonomy, and second, he was in charge of recruitment. District and sub-district cadres 
were responsible for propaganda, and the village chief compiled the list of his villagers 
eligible to serve the revolution. Hence he had an important role both for the conduct of 
propaganda and, later, deciding which youth would be conscripted.59 
Poverty and the worsening of the education system during the civil war both were 
powerful motivators since enrolling in the Khmer Rouge would not only provide income, 
but also training and employment for those who joined them. For example, a former 
Khmer Rouge using the pseudonym ‘Mary’ explained that most of the youths of her 
village joined the revolution to escape poverty: ‘We were so poor at the time. We wanted 
to liberate ourselves from poverty, and voluntarily served the revolution.’60 The 
significance of this message for the most destitute Cambodians is thus particularly 
relevant. 
For many, becoming Khmer Rouge personnel provided a unique opportunity to 
benefit from otherwise unattainable privileges before, or even after, Democratic 
Kampuchea. For example, many young soldiers were sent to China to learn photography, 
driving or take other technical courses. For example, Mary went to China to learn 
‘telephone techniques’ in 1977, but had to return to Cambodia after the arrest of her 
brother.61 In Cambodia, many were able to attain positions of authority, while this type of 
social mobility had never been accessible in other political systems. Instead of a daily 
struggle against poverty, these Cambodians were instead well-fed and respected. 
Presently, despite the taboo and resentment against the Khmer Rouge regime, a few 
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former Khmer Rouge retrospectively consider that period as their highest 
accomplishment. As a former female cadre, Sun Sokha reflected upon her time in the 
Khmer Rouge: 
When Sokha was a chief of an elderly unit, she seemed happy and proud. 
However, due to her current difficult living conditions, she had stopped 
thinking about the revolution. ‘I have never been remorseful about my 
life in the revolution. But for some reason, I just have a bad feeling. I 
struggled in the past… and now I am poor.’62 
 
The use of propaganda was also significant for persuading Cambodians to join 
their ranks. In response to the carpet bombings, the Khmer Rouge knew how to turn the 
peasants’ misfortunes into an opportunity to gather a larger following. Their propaganda 
often evolved around those bombings as Cambodians deeply resented their effects, but 
the Khmer Rouge often varied their messages in order to convince different people.  
Many Cambodians also believed that Sihanouk would return from to power in 
Phnom Penh after Lon Nol’s defeat. In reality, after 1975, Sihanouk did not have any 
input in decision-making, and the Khmer Rouge never intended to share their power with 
him. In fact, after 1975, Sihanouk was indeed allowed to return, but only a hostage of the 
Khmer Rouge.63 The Khmer Rouge were not solely responsible for this misinformation. 
Prince Sihanouk himself, from his base in China, enjoined Cambodians to join the 
struggle of what he believed to be a liberation movement trying to reinstate him in power. 
While such was the intention of many soldiers, this outcome was not achieved after their 
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victory. In fact, Sihanouk only provided free recruits and legitimacy to the forces that 
eventually destroyed the lives of so many Cambodians.  
Beside the formal propaganda from the Khmer Rouge, the enticement of friends, 
family and social acceptance of the revolution were also important in persuading the 
youths of the countryside to join the Khmer Rouge. The support of these social agents 
sometimes made the difference between joining or not. In certain cases, the potential 
soldiers themselves did not need to be enticed into recruitment. If a significant number of 
villagers or important members in their family followed the revolutionary guidelines, 
they would in turn try to influence younger members of their groups. Considering the 
hierarchical and patriarchal nature of Cambodian society, in many cases the children did 
not object to the desires of their parents, particularly their fathers. However, it should be 
noted that a few youths decided to join against the wishes of their parents. This 
disobedience was possible because even the parents had to submit to a greater authority: 
the coercive nature of the Khmer Rouge.  
So far, the previous motives were based on the choices of the young rural 
Cambodians, male and female, to join the Khmer Rouge, whether from their own desires 
or from their responses to propaganda. However, as the Khmer Rouge gained more 
control over territory, their recruitment tactics were increasingly coercive in nature. 
Young soldiers, at best, were ‘nominated’ to join the Khmer Rouge army. In other words, 
the Khmer Rouge effectively conscripted all the youths in a village to join them, 
regardless of their parents’ or the youth’s objections. More ominously, some were forced 
into joining under latent threats formulated against their family members remaining in the 
villages. In a village in Kandal province, in 1973, ‘girls and boys between the ages of 13 
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and 18 were selected by their village chiefs to serve the Khmer Rouge revolution. They 
did not understand why they should do so. They just obeyed their chiefs who said: ‘join 
the revolution to liberate the country.’64  
The Khmer Rouge were able to blackmail children into joining because of their 
recruitment structure. As detailed earlier, the village chief also fulfilled the role of the 
authority responsible for registering children eligible to join the Khmer Rouge. However, 
in some cases, several children and teenagers, either fearing death or missing their 
families, decided to desert and return back to their houses. When the village chief 
eventually discovered them, they sent them back to the front, reminding them that he also 
had the authority to make life difficult for their parents. In the same village mentioned 
above, a girl named Im Chan left the battlefield after being ordered to guard corpses, but 
back in her village, the chief ordered her back to the front. As her father explained: ‘If my 
daughter did not serve the revolution, she would be unable to escape death. All young 
women in the village were sent to the battlefield by the sub-district chief.’65 Regardless of 
the motive or method for recruitment, it was very difficult to quit the Khmer Rouge 
revolutionary army. 
In order to avoid the forcible recruitment of their children, particularly if some 
had already joined the Khmer Rouge, some parents enrolled them into monasteries. 
However, the Khmer Rouge had strict policies against the practice of religion, and 
eventually forcibly defrocked all monks. In some cases, the novice monks were 
defrocked and immediately forced to join the revolutionary army. Such was the case of 
Neth, a child monk who was forcibly defrocked, and sent to a school of politics in Phnom 
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Penh; he was eventually recruited to sample the food of the Khmer Rouge elite before 
each meal in prevention of poisoning attempts.66 
The different recruitment techniques and motives revealed an initial sketch of the 
complexity of the interplay of power and decision in the creation of an expanded Khmer 
Rouge apparatus. In some cases, being part of the Khmer Rouge corresponded to the 
fulfillment of their own desires. If they were eventually disillusioned with the regime, it 
does not change the fact that, with the knowledge available to them at that point in time, 
the majority chose to take part in the Khmer Rouge revolution. As the next section will 
address, the fulfillment of their expectations did not remain in their hands after they 
actually joined the Khmer Rouge.  
 
Expectations and Dissatisfaction 
 
 As soon as the Khmer Rouge claimed victory, the lives of Khmer Rouge members 
changed. Few were released from their units and sent back to their home villages. More 
commonly, they remained in their units and occupied various economic roles: mostly as 
farmers, but also as medical staff, factory workers, or otherwise in fishing units and salt 
production. A select few were sent in the small leadership or technical schools in Phnom 
Penh, or even in training abroad. Moreover, many continued as combatants, this time 
patrolling the cities, fields and borders, arresting suspects in their villages, guarding 
prisoners across the different security levels, including S-21, and finally, executing 
prisoners or any individuals selected by the Center or the local authorities. Regardless of 
their new role during Democratic Kampuchea, all these soldiers shared one thing in 
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common: they were no longer masters of their own destinies, and their preferences were 
not allowed to interfere with Angkar’s design for each one of them.  
 Furthermore, beside their actual occupation, these former soldiers had to abide to 
strict code of conduct forbidding them to speak against Angkar, long for their families or 
things of the past, own property or even fall in love. In this restrictive living situation, 
they also had to submit to daily self-criticism sessions, during which any serious 
accusation, legitimate or not, from a fellow member may lead to an untimely death. 
Accordingly, some former Khmer Rouge considered themselves after that period as 
victims of the government, and were shocked with the treatment that they received from 
other Cambodians who were often blaming them for the loss of their loved ones.  
 Yet, as articulated by Alexander Hinton, displacing the blame on higher 
authorities could also be a convenient method for guilty Khmer Rouge to prevent 
persecution or judgment from their fellow Cambodians.67 Hinton argued that it was more 
likely that while following these orders, some Khmer Rouge also chose to collaborate in 
order to fulfill their own desires. In fact, the combination of secrecy from the leaders and 
brutality gave local leaders impunity and power over the life and death of the 
Cambodians under their control, who could use the term ‘Angkar’ to fulfill their own 
ends. Some former Khmer Rouge cited their desire for revenge or their anger for the 
former Lon Nol regime as motives to join the Khmer Rouge. The government 
exacerbated this hatred through propaganda and included urban populations in their 
definition of ‘enemies.’ The persecution of civilians, particularly high-ranking civilian or 
military officials, thus follows from the set of motives evoking revenge or hatred.  
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 Still, some Khmer Rouge claimed that they were not aware of the extent of the 
people’s suffering during the regime, or even did not realize that any of them had 
suffered. Man, a Khmer Rouge soldier serving as an interpreter for Chinese engineers, 
claimed that ‘I did not notice how miserable the people were because I never faced a nard 
time. Once at a work site, after drinking coconut juice, we threw the coconut meat away, 
but I did not see the workers who picked them up to eat.’68 Considering the scale and 
geographical extent of the killings, such a perspective seems quite unlikely. Yet, the 
Khmer Rouge made a conscious effort to pursue secrecy by conducting killings mostly at 
night and at some distance from the work camps, often under some false pretext of 
relocating the victims. A few Cambodians claimed to be unaware of the government’s 
lethal side. Pol Pot’s wife, Khieu Ponnary, provides a good, if surprising, example: even 
though she had been active politically during the civil war, she seemed to have 
succumbed to some mental illness in 1975 and lived in an isolated house for the duration 
of the regime. In most cases, these former soldiers probably used such claims to 
undermine their responsibility in the deaths of their compatriots. Still, exposure to the 
killings varied, as did the responsibility of these Khmer Rouge. 
 Finally, this overview of different motives or processes in joining the Khmer 
Rouge explicate how the behavior of members of the Khmer Rouge varied despite the 
existence of a totalitarian state with a rigid set of rules and punishments. Base and new 
people in Cambodia had repeatedly noticed differences in their living conditions with 
changes of the local leader. Some leaders and soldiers were often responsible for acts of 
cruelty against civilians beyond their orders. Yet, some base and new people noted that 
other Khmer Rouge leaders or soldiers were more humane, and indeed, a few admitted 
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that the direct intervention from these authorities saved their lives. As noted in the first 
chapter, this variation can be partially accounted for with the relative decentralization in 
Cambodia, but even within the same region or even village, important fluctuations 
occurred when there were changes in leadership. This chapter presented the hypothesis 
that the large array of motives and resulting expectations were a plausible explanation for 
such discrepancy. The recognition of the heterogeneity of the Khmer Rouge is necessary 
to understand the existence of a space of negotiation with certain leaders and appreciate 

















Chapter 3- Shades of Compliance 
 
The Khmer Rouge established a totalitarian government that was, by definition, 
particularly coercive in nature. As soon as they achieved victory, they immediately 
implemented radical measures of social revolution: evacuation of cities, relocation of 
urban and rural population to different areas of the countryside, destruction of religious 
symbols, currency, markets, identification documents, private property and any other 
aspect that could link their new subjects to their previous social or economic situation in 
the Lon Nol or Sihanouk regime. From the information that they collected from official 
documents and autobiographies, the Khmer Rouge began their first mass killings by 
eliminating former high-ranking civilians and military personnel. Vickery’s depiction of 
the evacuation somehow glosses over the elimination of enemies and the atrocities of the 
evacuation, yet the majority of works describing that period of the regime and my own 
research refer to the massacres of Lon Nol officers and even the hunt of soldiers who first 
escaped their scrutiny.69  
This chapter focuses on the new and base people’s compliance with the Khmer 
Rouge under their repressive rule. Even when survivors took other decisions, or if their 
accounts did not refer to their cooperation to the regime, cooperation was a necessary 
prerequisite to life in this new Cambodia. While this chapter seeks to address the reality 
of the coercive apparatus and its effects on society, it also aims to present the agency of 
relatively disadvantaged groups in undermining the system of classification separating 
socio-economic groups in new social classes. The new and base people could undermine 
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this system by emulating (or at least attempting to perform) the behavior of the Khmer 
Rouge’s desired subject population, concealing or assuming a different identity.  
The first section of this chapter therefore documents the specific policies linked to 
the creation of new identities and the rights subsequently granted to each identity. Even 
though their classification of citizens seemed accurate and the rural-urban cleavage was 
considerable, a closer examination of each individual Cambodian’s past history reveals 
that their complex identities often crossed those simplistic categorizations. The external 
appearance of cooperation often belied a voluntary and sometimes elaborate performance 
by many Cambodians to avoid attracting attention on themselves.  
 Following the overview of these Khmer Rouge policies, this chapter continues 
with a section on descriptions of the helplessness overcoming Cambodians during that 
period. Their interpretation of the regime is crucial to understand why they chose to adopt 
some behavior over another and how the lens of their previous beliefs informed their 
perspective of the regime. For instance, many survivors’ accounts were using religious 
terminology to describe this unsettling situation. Finally, the last section elaborates on the 
precise strategies employed to perform the role of the expected revolutionary. These 
accounts from different regions in Cambodia will provide details on how Khmer Rouge 
social categories could be circumvented during the regime. 
 
Complete Social Transformation 
 
 Even more so than the advent of the Khmer Rouge, the nature of its revolution has 
been one of the most common themes for publication about Democratic Kampuchea. 
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Michael Vickery, for example, put forth the notion of a ‘peasant revolution’, since he did 
not consider the Khmer Rouge leaders as following appropriately the maxims of 
Communism.70 As the title of his main work on Democratic Kampuchea mentions, Ben 
Kiernan rather believes that power and race were the most significant motivators behind 
developments of the Khmer Rouge regime. He noted that race and ethnicity under the 
Khmer Rouge have been overlooked by previous scholars and then argued that, along 
with internal struggle for power, ‘Khmer Rouge conceptions of race often overshadowed 
those of class.’ 71 He gives as example the fact that official propaganda claimed that the 
population was 99 percent of Khmer origin, thus overlooking a fifth of the population 
that did not share this Khmer ethnicity. Also, in Khmer Rouge leadership, racial lines 
took precedence over revolutionary credentials. 
Interestingly, W.E. Willmot argues that the Khmer Rouge leadership has 
mistakenly overplayed the notion of class in rural Cambodia and downplayed ethnicity in 
rural-urban conflicts.72 From his analysis of Pol Pot’s 1977 Party Anniversary speech and 
Khieu Samphan’s PhD dissertation, he argues that these leaders generalized the relative 
rural inequalities from the province of Battambang to the rest of Cambodia and blindly 
applied principles from other revolutionary context such as Vietnam, China and the 
Soviet Union. In fact, unlike its neighbors, the Cambodian countryside suffered little 
from rural landlordism, and French scholar Jean Delvert even deemed pre-civil war 
Cambodia ‘an almost perfect rural Democracy.’ While this enthusiastic description might 
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not be exactly correct, Willmot rather locates the agrarian problem in the exploitative 
relationship between the rural merchant, usually Chinese, and the Khmer farmers. 
 Willmot concludes that this error led the Khmer Rouge leadership to force 
policies to address this perceived inequality between landlords and peasants and interpret 
the massive support from rural Cambodians during the civil war as the validation of their 
hypothesis –even if the reasons were in fact quite unrelated. This mistaken mandate 
emboldened the Khmer Rouge leaders to implement brutal measures that were also 
immensely unpopular amongst the very people who were supposed to beneficiate from 
them.   
 The views presented above discuss the relative importance of ethnicity and class 
in Khmer Rouge ideology, but regardless of their comparative importance, both identities 
of Cambodians during the Lon Nol regime reflected the hierarchy of their status in 
Democratic Kampuchea. This section explores the implication of the existence of such a 
hierarchy and its repercussions on the behavior of Cambodians: as ‘base’ or ‘old’ people 
were favored by the regime and consequentially suffered less, the ‘new’ people therefore 
strove to be considered as base people in order to enjoy more rights and increase their 
chances of survival. From this need arose the decision of concealing their identities. 
 As the first published book on the subject of Democratic Kampuchea, Francois 
Ponchaud’s Cambodge Année Zéro already made reference to the existence of a hierarchy 
from interviews of refugees. He noticed the basic division of society: ‘First and foremost, 
the ‘people’ (pracheachon) are factory workers and peasants. [...] Those whose behaviour 
is detrimental to the people, or even Khmers Rouges who make mistakes, are called ‘sub-
people’ (anoupracheachon). This goes some way to explain why the townspeople have 
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been treated so harshly: they weren’t real part of the people.’73 This definition refers to 
the most basic delimitation of the social classes in Cambodia, and touches upon the issue 
of their differential treatment in the eyes of the Khmer Rouge leadership. In other works, 
Ponchaud’s ‘people’ are often referred to with various synonyms such as the ‘old people’, 
the ‘base people’, ‘the ancients’, and other related terms. As for the ‘sub-people’, they 
were more often referred to as ‘new people’ or ‘April 17th people’, from the date of 
liberation.  
 A second type of hierarchy may have operated along ‘racial’ or ethnic lines as 
well. Kiernan in particular developed his work on that aspect of the Khmer Rouge 
regime. The Khmer Rouge did not merely intend to promote a ‘Khmer race’ at the 
detriment of other ethnic groups, since Khmers were quite as likely as members of 
another ethnic group to suffer or perish during the regime. The aim of these statements 
could have been the promotion of Cambodian nationalism or, even more so, a concept of 
unity that could be traced back in Angkorian times. In fact, according to several sources, 
the only groups to apparently benefit from a favorable bias during the regime were 
mountainous tribes of Northeastern Cambodia: the Khmer Rouge leadership seemed 
personally grateful for their assistance during the infancy stages of the revolution and Pol 
Pot only trusted them as personal bodyguards.74 
 On the other hand, Angkar clearly singled out some ethnic groups for 
displacement or execution. In relation with its conflict with Vietnam , the governing party 
specifically targeted ethnic groups associated with this country. More precisely, the 
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Vietnamese were either deported to Vietnam or completely executed from Cambodia.75 
Correspondingly, another group known as the Khmer Krom was also targeted.76 
However, whether other ethnic groups like the Chams or the Chinese were also subject to 
targeted persecution from Angkar or were simply caught like all Cambodians in the 
CPK’s radical policies is more debated amongst researchers of the period.77  
Acknowledging this clear difference in treatment, many Cambodians from 
different ethnic groups also sought to use their complex identities in order to escape 
persecution based on ethnicity. In other words, many Cambodians had a mixed ethnic 
heritage from intermarriage, most often between Khmer and Chinese, but also between 
Khmers and Vietnamese, Lao or Thai. However, due to the often imposed nature of 
ethnic identities, the option of assuming the identity of a different ethnic group was less 
frequent than the possibility of dissimulating one’s socio-economic origin.  
 
Powerlessness and Beliefs  
 
 The Tuol Sleng security prison in Phnom Penh represents a ghastly aspect of the 
regime, where around 17,000 Cambodians, mostly Khmer Rouge members, lost their 
lives after being interrogated, tortured and then finally executed in the outskirts of the 
city. Yet this cause of death during the Khmer Rouge represents less than 0.1 percent of 
the casualty figure during this period. Typically, in the words of Kiernan, ‘cynical 
deception and stupefying violence’ were the means used to execute enemies of the 
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regime.78 Mostly after dark, executors selected the victims for ‘relocation’, only to lead 
them to a forest or grove near their village and work camps for a crude execution using 
agricultural implements, clubs or knives to save precious bullets. Most Cambodians were 
thus eliminated outside the knowledge of their loved ones. Yet death also came in the 
form of disease, starvation and overwork. Many perished in hospitals or collapsed on the 
worksite, much to the indifference of the local Khmer Rouge leaders and soldiers. With 
time, this indifference, or rather resignation, even spread to the victims’ relatives, as 
death was now becoming common and expected. In fact, some parents even expressed a 
distressing relief at the death of the few newborns during the regime, considering that 
death was preferable to life in that hated regime.  
Considering that 80 percent of Cambodians were Buddhists of the Theravada faith 
in 1975, this religious background was likely to impact the response to the government 
for some survivors. For instance, a few noted that despite having a burning desire to 
revolt or kill Khmer Rouge soldiers, their belief in karma prevented them to take such 
actions. For example, an interviewee using the pseudonym Look Tha (grandfather), a 
former villager now refugee in the United States, recalled that ‘even if I was angry with 
the Pol Pots, I never said or did anything to get revenge; if I did so, I would also be bad 
like them. I believed that if I had acted badly in a previous life, something bad will 
happen to me in this life. But if in a previous life I had not killed, stolen or done bad 
things to other people, I would escape being killed by the Pol Pots.’79  
On the other hand, not all Cambodian Buddhists expressed the effect of religious 
beliefs on decisions and actions. For instance, while she felt the same anger towards the 
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Khmer Rouge, Nya Srey, a young housewife who also emigrated to the United States, 
reasoned that ‘I felt very angry and revengeful then, but there was nothing I could do; I 
didn’t want to be killed.’80 For that reason, religious causality should not be overplayed, 
but it still influenced many Cambodians’ perception of the regime and their choice of 
behavior under those trying circumstances. 
An aspect of Cambodian Buddhism in particular had an important impact on their 
perception of the regime. In the 19th century, Puth, a Buddhist monk, allegedly made a 
prophecy about terrifying events that would occur in the future in Cambodia. This ‘Puth 
Prophecy’ related to the sudden empowerment of thmils, who would unleash untold 
sufferings, death and hunger, upon the Khmer people. The latter would be caught 
between ‘tigers and crocodiles’ (thought to refer to the Khmer Rouge and the 
Vietnamese). Besides apocalyptical premonitions, this prophecy also came with 
guidelines for survival: those who knew how to plant a ‘kapok tree’ would be able to 
survive. Samnom Sarot recalled that ‘my grandmother uttered a saying: ‘We have houses 
and roads, but no one lives in or walks on them. People fight to get a single grain of rice 
sticking on a dog’s tail... Grandchildren, you must grow sesame and kapok trees. When 
it’s time to run, run to the Northeast to have peace.’ Planting kapok means do not answer 
when you are asked, and growing sesame refers to stupidity.’81 This old saying based on 
the previously mentioned prophecy found many echoes throughout Cambodia, hence 
obedience to the regime could be seen not only as an expected reaction, but also as a 
reflexive decision informed by some Cambodians’ beliefs. 
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Obedience and Volunteering 
 
 Arising from the existence of this pervasive violence and repression, obedience to 
the Khmer Rouge seemed to be the only possible way to survive during Democratic 
Kampuchea. Chan Yim, an elderly housewife at the service of Northern Zone leader, 
considered her life as ‘water in a piece of broken cup, which could spill easily.’82 She 
added in the same interview that only eight among a hundred midwives saw the end of 
the regime. She also claimed that she succeeded to survive because she insisted to eat at 
Ke Pauk’s table, and only repeated what she was instructed to during the meetings.  
Ung Vuth, another midwife working under the service of Ta Mok, voluntarily left 
Phnom Penh in the early seventies to practice as a nurse for the Khmer Rouge.83 For half 
of the regime, the village, sub-district and district chiefs particularly respected her as a 
diligent worker who did not report any deaths during her service. Ta Mok even 
personally arranged her wedding. Yet, despite her hard work, she was sent to Sanlong 
Prison in the south of country after her parents were accused of treason. She eventually 
lost all of her twelve relatives under the Khmer Rouge. 
Kuch Van, an elderly woman living close to the Vietnamese border, reported 
being tempted in crossing to the other side, a feat that she witnessed many of her 
neighbors achieve.84 She nevertheless maintained that the Khmer Rouge would kill her 
family in retribution if she succeeded to take refuge in Vietnam. She summarized her life 
under the Khmer Rouge as such: ‘I ate according to what they gave me, I never stole 
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since I was scared of being killed, tortured or criticized. I obeyed, so I am still alive.’85 
The previous stories and this last example summarize the life and the attitude of a 
significant number of Cambodians towards the Khmer Rouge. These Cambodians obeyed 
all the rules to avoid retribution, and attribute this decision to their survival. Yet, as 
following examples illustrate, obedience was often not sufficient to live through the 
regime. The previously quoted Cambodians were all base people, who faced food 
scarcity, but not starvation; threat of death, but not systematic execution.  
The ‘volunteers’, Cambodians who decided to work even more than required, 
already challenged the assumption that strict obedience was the only existing or valid 
attitude to adopt with the Khmer Rouge. For example, Nguon Saing Ly, a student from 
Phnom Penh, was relocated in Kandal province after 1975.86 Like other new people 
evacuees, he was assigned to farm rice; however, he volunteered to work in the much 
despised ‘number one fertilizer unit’, which consisted of collecting human feces from 
latrines in order to produce fertilizers for the rice fields. He took this decision because he 
observed that, despite the disgust inspired by this task, the work was actually much less 
demanding than toiling in the fields. At the same time, the authorities would favorably 
remember this kind of initiative. 
However, Pin Yathay warned against the danger of working more in order to win 
the favors of the Khmer Rouge leaders. He noticed that in his work camp in the jungle of 
Kampong Chhnang province, the first casualties claimed by the harsh working conditions 
were not women or the elderly, but rather healthy, well-built men. He concluded that, in 
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their anxiousness to demonstrate their loyalty to the regime, they often surpassed their 
limits and were never able to recover with the limited food supplies.87  
Pin also demonstrated another rationale for volunteering. Freedom of movement 
was strictly prohibited under the new regime, but sometimes, the leaders had to select 
some of their people for relocation in other areas of the country. In order to perform those 
selections, they often asked for volunteers, hence opened the door for opportunities: new 
people were then confronted with choices. The leaders provided little information about 
the new location, and those who chose to volunteer had to estimate the chances of having 
a better livelihood (less work, more food) according to the new location. As a result, Pin 
volunteered twice for relocation, as both locations were leading him closer to the Thai 
border, his ultimate goal for escape.88 Similarly, Hour Chea, another refugee, volunteered 
to work in the jungle, because he thought that he would be able to pick more food in the 
forest than relying on the minute portions offered in the villages.89 He was able to 
withstand the dangers of the jungle for a while, but eventually succumbed to malaria and 
had to return to the village. 
 
The Performance of Compliance 
 
 As detailed in the first section, the Khmer Rouge had precise policies regarding 
the classification of the diverse social identities. Before the advent of Democratic 
Kampuchea, educated and uneducated Cambodians composed two very distinct societies. 
Kiernan addressed this division in economic terms: ‘one rural, producing for subsistence, 
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the other largely urban, producing a few goods for the world market and consuming 
mostly international commodities. Rice growers provided food for the city dwellers, but 
the cities offered little for rural consumption.’90 Milton Osborne was also aware of the 
discrepancy between both societies when he realized that ‘villages [...] were a world I 
could not penetrate’, even after having allegedly visited them hundreds of times.91 During 
his work in Cambodia and historical research in the fifties and sixties, he was well 
acquainted with many urbanites, yet still considered village life as foreign.  
 Perhaps a telling sign of the discrepancy between both groups was the language. 
In fact, the Khmer language, besides variations in accents in different provinces, has a 
different vocabulary associated with the rural and the urban portions of the population. In 
addition to differences in Khmer, educated urbanites were often instructed in French, the 
face of colonization in Cambodia. Even after independence, French continued as an elite 
language and persisted through various schools. Furthermore, the French government 
offered scholarship to a few university students to pursue their higher education in 
France. 
 Accordingly, many educated Cambodians attempted to conceal their education in 
order to avoid being subjected to the harsh treatment imposed on the new people, or the 
execution of those who did not display sufficient ‘change’ to this new revolutionary 
lifestyle. They either did so by hiding their class or their urban origin. 
 Meng Reaksmey’s father, occupying an important position in the Ministry of 
Agriculture, pretended on the day of the invasion to be merely a chauffeur for the 
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Ministry and drove a commander around Phnom Penh.92 When he was gathering 
necessary medicine from a pharmacy, he polished his story by claiming that he needed to 
know how to use anti-malarial medicine when driving officials to the jungles. Pin Yathay 
similarly downplayed his role in the Ministry of Public Works, referring to his previous 
position as a technician.93 He also started to introduce himself as Thay, in fear of being 
recognized by name.  
 If the identity of high-level ministry workers was dangerous, the threat of 
execution was imminent for the former high-level military officers. Serey Len Deour’s 
father, a lieutenant-colonel in the Lon Nol Republican army, tried to hide his identity as a 
high-ranking member of the army by pretending to be a former basketball coach.94 
However, his attempt was short-lived, as within a month, his real identity was uncovered 
and he was subsequently executed. As both types of positions, high-ranking ministerial or 
military officials, were more liable for persecution and execution, they tried to associate 
their identity with lower-class occupations, in an attempt to appeal to leniency from the 
Khmer Rouge cadres.  
However, they did not try to hide their urban and educated background, thus were 
nevertheless considered as new people. The danger of concealing their identities was very 
high: many Cambodians knew who they were and could denounce them; the Khmer 
Rouge intelligence apparatus retrieved employee rosters and compared them with the 
information gathered by local cadres. Yet until such evidence would present itself, urban 
evacuees had the benefit of doubt in relation with their former rank in the urban centers. 
As Sok Suong, a villager from Pursat, lamented: ‘At that time we could not lie to [the 
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Khmer Rouge] because the chief and I lived in the same village. He knew my family’s 
background well. Those evacuated from Phnom Penh could hide their backgrounds as no 
one knew them.’95 His envy towards the former city dwellers is understandable: his wife 
was a Khmer Krom, and consequently, he lost her and his daughter during Khmer Rouge 
executions of the members of this ethnicity in 1978.  
 In relation with identity, ethnic identities were also significant, and members of 
different minority groups also had to dissimulate their background. For instance, Ma 
Khin Me was a Khmer Kola, a Cambodian of Burmese descent from the west of the 
country.96 She remembered that the village chief informed her that she would be executed 
if she was heard speaking Kola, even with her children. From barely knowing Khmer, her 
children could not remember their mother tongue by the end of the regime. Yet, she 
added that the Khmer Rouge were not persecuting the Kolas, because ‘they trusted the 
Kolas’ integrity.’97 Her story would support the argument that a hierarchy between 
ethnicities was indeed in place in Democratic Kampuchea, but she is refuting that her 
ethnic group was particularly mistreated as a group. 
 The Khmer Krom and the Vietnamese were not as fortunate. Chay Kim, another 
Khmer married to a Khmer Krom, lived in Kandal province before the Khmer Rouge, but 
was relocated in Pursat with many Khmer Kroms during the regime.98 Unlike Sok Suong 
though, she knew that the Khmer Rouge were planning to execute all Khmer Krom. 
During a meeting, when the Khmer Rouge officials divided the Khmers and the Khmer 
Krom, she pretended to be a Khmer Krom: she wanted to die with her husband and her 
                                                 
95
 Dany Long, Searching for the Truth, First Quarter 2005, 22. 
96




 Kannith Keo Kim, Searching for the Truth, Number 36, December 2002, 25. 
 55
seven children. She even defied her husband in taking this decision. However, during the 
meeting, her husband stood up and said: ‘My wife is not a Khmer Krom. May I leave her 
in your care? If she survives, please look after her.’99 Many witnesses confirmed his 
claim, and while her husband was taken away for execution, Chay Kim survived with all 
her children. Her story represents the opposite example of Khmers who assumed the 
identity of minorities for various reasons. Other Khmers from Kompong Som 
(Sihanoukville) pretended to be Vietnamese in order to be deported to Vietnam, although 
their fate after being taken from the village is not known.100 
 Din Oeun, a Khmer woman married to a Vietnamese, also recalled how her 
husband was taken for execution: ‘I think that they killed my husband because they 
learned about him through the statistics each village collected. I never told anyone my 
husband was a Yuon; they knew it themselves’.101 Even before the Khmer Rouge victory, 
she was trying to convince her husband to leave for Vietnam, but he refused, saying that 
‘I am happy to live and die here.’102 This last story illustrates that although it was difficult 
for one to dissimulate his or her ethnic identity, there was nevertheless a choice involved 
in choosing to seek refuge in other countries.  
 The previous examples began to challenge the simplicity of identities as seen by 
the Khmer Rouge. For the ethnic identities, the frequency of intermarriage blurred the 
lines between ethnic groups for married couples, and even more so for their children. 
Marriages between Khmers and Chinese were quite common in the cities, but not all 
cases specify the origin of their parents. Thus any division based on ethnicity was 
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arbitrary. For example, Neou Kim Ann, a Khmer villager from Kampong Cham, was 
refused a position in a special unit under a ministry because he had ‘a Vietnamese 
name.’103 Whether the CPK dictated policies according to ethnic groups or local 
authorities influenced their decisions on previous racist biases, the real complexity of 
ethnic identities in Cambodia proved to be a deterrent to such reductive categorization 
and a possibility for some Cambodians to adapt their identity to the situation.   
 While there was indeed an important cleavage between urban and rural groups, 
these geographical divisions were debatable.  First of all, as mentioned earlier, the 
population of Phnom Penh consisted overwhelmingly of rural refugees escaping 
bombardments and fighting on the ground, yet they were all considered as new people at 
the same level as urbanites. Second, the classification of these ‘new people’ encompassed 
rural territory still under the control of Lon Nol forces prior to April 17th 1975. This 
division did not correlate with the villagers’ allegiance in contrast to the proximity of 
those territories to major cities and roads, thus easier to defend for the motorized Lon Nol 
army. Finally, there was a lot of rural-urban migration, hence many urbanites were 
former villagers who sometimes were able to climb social ranks. Such were the stories of 
the published memoirs of Pin Yathay, Hour Chea and Moeung Sonn, who all came from 
modest backgrounds, but could attain French scholarships to continue their higher 
education in France. They then enjoyed high positions in the capital upon their return.  
Even without foreign education, before the Khmer Rouge regime, some 
Cambodians were able to enrich themselves and move to the urban centers while 
retaining their possessions in the countryside. Hence, many evacuees from Phnom Penh, 
even those who had migrated permanently, often aimed to return to their home villages, 
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where many of their relatives were often still living. Those familial links often 
transcended class or urban-rural cleavages and were therefore meaningful in those 
evacuees’ survival. These numerous fault lines running through Khmer Rouge’s identity 
policies produced many injustices and simultaneously allowed many urban evacuees to 
use their knowledge from their rural roots to survive the regime by retracing their own 
personal histories, often linked with the Cambodian peasants.  
The arbitrary reclassification of post-revolutionary society into different identities 
disadvantaged greatly the poor peasants who found refuge in cities, the only places 
spared from bombings during the civil war. For example, the population of Phnom Penh 
swelled from 400,000 in 1970 to two million in 1975.104 Yet, the Khmer Rouge 
considered those refugees at the same level as other urbanites. Unlike the latter though, 
they did not enjoy remnants from past economic benefits.105 At the same time, some of 
these refugees negotiated with Khmer Rouge and base people to convince them of their 
humble origins. 
 In order to study further the limits of class cleavages, we need to delve in the 
complex relationship between members of each ‘class’ under the Khmer Rouge found in 
most of the interviews. As these previously segregated groups had to live either in the 
same village or in nearby locations, they had frequent interactions, albeit initially rarely 
cordial ones. The base people viewed the newcomers with suspicion, and the Khmer 
Rouge did its best to bring the worst out of their perception of the ‘new people’. On their 
side, the urbanites, beside a possible prejudice against the villagers, generally viewed 
them as active and willing participants of the revolution.  
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With time, some tensions subsided, but in their shared plight and increased mutual 
understanding, many of their relationships improved. Soun Seyla, coming from a middle-
class family from Battambang, witnessed how her father succeeded to improve their 
situation by interacting with the villagers:  
After my father created strong bonds with the base people of Ta Siev, we were 
in a much better position than other April 17 families. Eventually, we became 
base people because our family got on with them very well. The village chief 
Kean loved my family a lot. This caused some base families to become jealous, 
but they could not make trouble for us. We were allowed to have a few 
possessions – we owned land and a house, which was very rare for those in 
April 17 class.106 
 
 This chapter aimed to address the issue of compliance, as dictated through the 
inflexible terms set by the Khmer Rouge. However, the various examples illustrated both 
the complexity of the responses to Khmer Rouge rules and imperatives as well as the 
complexity (or superficiality) of their own ethnic and social identities. While repression, 
harsh living conditions and arbitrary executions plagued their lives, many Cambodians’ 
religious belief also instructed them on the best course of actions in those difficult times, 
rather than being only passive agents from a persecuting force. The Khmer Rouge’s 
reductive associations created injustices and allowed some of the new people to attain 
better positions by being able to emulate peasant behavior.  
Finally, while compliance was often seen as the wisest choice under the Khmer 
Rouge, a quote from Ma Khin Me points to its possible insufficiency: ‘[...] The Kolas 
dared not rebel against Angkar. Because they did everything Angkar told them to, most 
Kolas died as a result of insufficient food, also, they were not good at seeking food 
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[sic].’107 From this logic, unwavering obedience is associated with failure, and this 
conclusion led many Cambodians to take more antagonistic approaches, as will be 
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Chapter 4-Resistance: Disobedience and Rebellion 
 
In addressing the topic of resistance in Southeast Asia, James Scott’s thesis from 
his work Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance seems 
particularly relevant. This pertinence applies to this chapter, since Scott also argued for 
the importance of everyday resistance in creating significant outcomes, in contrast to 
rarer and unfortunate peasant rebellions and uprisings.108 However, Kiernan replied that 
this type of resistance would only have been possible during Democratic Kampuchea if 
Cambodian peasants were ‘being left alone with an adequate subsistence.’109 By this 
assertion, he implied that Cambodian peasants and new people were unable to resist in 
traditional ways since they were under surveillance and were deprived of adequate food 
supplies. I also agree that the extraordinary circumstances of the Democratic Kampuchea 
period prevented the usual means of everyday resistance, yet everyday resistance still 
existed in other forms that acknowledged the constant surveillance and harsh 
punishments, because such resistance provided another successful way to acquire 
sufficient subsistence.  
The difference arises from a contextual understanding of the concept of 
‘resistance’ as applied to that period. As Kiernan rightly pointed out, the circumstances of 
Democratic Kampuchea prevented most attempts of traditional resistance otherwise 
witnessed in Cambodia under other regimes. However, the near absence of traditional 
resistance under Scott’s definition or even in a more ‘Western’ understanding did not 
signify that resistance did not occur during the Khmer Rouge regime. For this research, I 
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defined resistance simply as any intentional and voluntary infringement of rules set by 
Angkar. As a result, I recorded the large extent of disobedience predominantly motivated 
by the lack of food in several regions.  
 The first part of this chapter examines the implementation of agricultural policies 
and reviews the roots for the devastating outcome of mass starvation. In yet another 
tragic irony of the regime, even if agricultural production lay at the core of the Khmer 
Rouge’s economic policies, the agricultural output actually decreased in comparison with 
the national rice production during the civil war.  
During the first year of the regime, Cambodians already noticed the scarcity in the 
availability of food and medicine. Fortunately, the negative effects from the Khmer 
Rouge’s agricultural and trade policies were temporarily withstood with the remaining 
provisions from the Lon Nol regime. However, those supplies were limited and starvation 
soon took its toll on the overworked Cambodians, who were also forbidden to own or 
even collect any food source. In fact, the situation became so difficult that cooperation 
alone was often not sufficient for survival: despite the threat of harsh physical 
punishment, many Cambodians disobeyed in order to secure enough food for themselves.  
The next section of this chapter follows how the failing macro-economic policies 
and the limited access of food for most Cambodians led some of them to disobey in order 
to alleviate starvation. An important aspect in securing more food, trade with the base 
people or the Khmer Rouge, will be discussed in details in the last chapter. The different 
interviews revealed that the scale of such disobedience was almost as extensive as the 
cooperation with the regime, and in many cases, simultaneous.  
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The last part of this chapter discusses the most threatening instances of resistance, 
manifested in several spontaneous rebellions, conspiracies and the creation of anti-Khmer 
Rouge forces. This first aspect of subsistence-motivated small-scale disobedience ought 
to be differentiated with the large-scale rebellions aimed at overthrowing the government. 
From the existing literature on the topic, the second aspect will analyze the implications 
of previous hypotheses by contrasting the data compiled for this research.  
 
Economic Failures and Starvation 
 
 Agricultural production featured prominently in the leaders of the Khmer Rouge’s 
agenda. Pol Pot’s speech during the Party’s Anniversary in 1977 summarized the Khmer 
Rouge ideology: ‘We take agriculture as the basic factor and use the fruits of agriculture 
to systematically build industry in order to advance toward rapidly transforming a 
Cambodia marked by a backward agriculture into a Cambodia marked by a modernized 
agriculture.’110  Misleadingly, this project of ‘modernization’ only involved manual labor 
and natural fertilizer, thus avoided the use of mechanized and industrial agricultural 
techniques. The Khmer Rouge only aimed at an increase in the output of the most 
important food source, rice, and they implemented this objective through the evacuation 
of the urbanites to the countryside and their participation in farm work, massive irrigation 
projects across the country and jungle clearing to increase the extent of agricultural land.  
 In order to maximize labor for rice production, the Khmer Rouge divided the 
population into cooperative units and mobile work unit. They prohibited all private 
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ownership, and by the end of 1975, introduced communal eating throughout the country. 
The working cooperatives, each representing a single village or work camp, regrouped 
around fifty up to five hundred workers.111 In the middle of the regime, the size of 
cooperative substantially grew in order to encompass a few villages. Each worker had to 
complete a certain quota per day, according to the season and his function: sowing grains, 
planting seedlings, harvesting rice, digging earth, carrying stones, collecting human or 
animal waste, amongst other things.  
 Other than sedentary farmers -married adults and elderly Cambodians- teenagers 
and children were typically enrolled in mobile work units. These working groups were 
broadly organized like military units and affected to different projects across a certain 
sub-district or district. The type of work expected from them tended to vary, although it 
mostly consisted of digging canals or building dams throughout the duration of the 
regime. For both types of workers, the idyllic rhythm of work associated with farmers 
was rather replaced with an industrial requirement of constant activity, without pause.112  
With the increased workforce and incessant work, one could expect at least an 
increase in production. Yet, Twining estimated that the actual production in fact 
decreased to about half the amount produced in the troubled times of the early 
seventies.113 Jeffery Himel cites, among many reasons, that the Khmer Rouge substituted 
the several varieties of rice naturally growing in Cambodia with a homogenous ‘high-
yielding’ variety of rice from China unsuitable for the soil and geography of all regions 
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of Cambodia.114 Another significant reason for the failure of rice growth, according to 
Himel, referred to the absence of imported insecticides and fertilizers. In fact, each 
cooperative had to collect its own human or animal waste in order to produce fertilizers, 
which indeed helped the growth of rice, but not sufficiently when compared to chemical 
fertilizers. Pertaining to the issue of pesticides, Hour Chea recalled that because rats and 
other pests were eating their crops, two persons every hour for each night were selected 
to make loud noises while walking through the fields in order to chase the rats away.115  
This extensive construction of the dams and canals during the regime should have 
improved in the water distribution system in Cambodia. In fact, ‘in an inventory of 
Cambodian irrigation systems conducted in 1993-1994, fully 79% of the schemes had 
been constructed in the short period of Democratic Kampuchea’.116 This achievement 
occurred during the four short years of the regime and surpassed quantitatively all other 
projects in Cambodian history. Yet, qualitatively these projects could not withstand 
Cambodia’s annual flooding season, and many were destroyed at worst, unusable at best. 
Himel detailed other technical mistakes made by the Khmer Rouge, objecting to take 
heed of advice from engineers of the ancient regime, but rather encouraging local leaders 
to undertake large irrigation projects through ‘trial and error’.117 The exclusive use of 
manual labor and local soil to build dams, often on flat land, rendered them vulnerable to 
erosion and of marginal utility.118 Overall, the massive irrigation projects were a minimal 
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success, but considering the amount of labor, and victims, of these large-scale works, the 
irrigation projects cost much more than what they produced. 
Before these failures in planning and implementation, Communist collective 
farming already had a poor record in other countries prior to the Khmer Rouge. The first 
such program in USSR before the Second World War was imposed on unwilling peasants 
with massive purges and persecutions for resistance. Yet the Communist Party dropped 
the program after realizing its inefficiency. Maoist China suffered a similar fate in the 
late fifties and early sixties with the equally tragic ‘Great Leap Forward,’ which 
particularly influenced Pol Pot’s agricultural policy. Again, after massive loss of human 
lives resulting from starvation, such program was dropped. In neighboring Vietnam, the 
Communist Party sustained its collectivization during the war, but the regime collapsed 
soon after the reunification of the country.119 However, the Khmer Rouge did not learn 
from those historical and monumental mistakes and rather tried to surpass those 
experiments through even more radical measures.  
Democratic Kampuchea’s trade practices further exacerbated the food problem. 
Despite the country’s restricted foreign policy and claims of economic independence, the 
Khmer Rouge still relied on China and North Korea for military hardware, technicians 
and foreign currency.120 In 1977, the leaders of the Khmer Rouge boasted having sold 
100,000 tons of rice to Yugoslavia, Madagascar and Hong Kong.121 Sometimes, 
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Democratic Kampuchea even offered rice in the form of aid to other socialist and African 
countries.122  
 Finally, new people’s access of food was more linked to food distribution than 
food production. Even with a diminished input in rice, Cambodians might have 
substituted that lack from other vegetables or meat. However, Angkar was meant to 
provide all food and the cooperative was responsible for distributing it, while private 
property or seeking other sources of food was forbidden. Members of a cooperative thus 
received a uniform amount of food in the form of rice or rice gruel.123 The rice was 
measured in a milk tin, which Twining estimated to a daily average of approximately 250 
grams.124 Furthermore, while the unit of measurement remained the same, more persons 
had to share those already insufficient rations. For instance, during his stay in the jungle 
in Pursat, Pin Yathay noticed that the daily ration decreased from a tin for four persons to 
a tin for six persons within a few weeks in 1975.125 
While in the previous chapter some informants attributed their survival to their 
unwavering obedience, others rather believed in the necessity of disobedience. Nya Srey, 
for instance, was unable to work during the regime due to sickness and received only a 
portion of the already meager daily rations, but ‘when [her children] managed to steal 
some rice, [her son] ground it secretly and [her] daughter winnowed it with her hands.’126  
She thus concluded: ‘I survived because of my children.’ Even more so, she survived 
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because they repeatedly transgressed the rules of Angkar in their quest for food, as many 
other Cambodians also decided to do. 
 
The Necessity and Forms of Disobedience 
 
  Disobedience was not only linked to the necessity to gather more food, but also 
the physiological despair resulting from malnourishment. Consequently, a number of 
accounts elaborated on the urge to get enough food, regardless of the risks involved. For 
example, Sim Soth was involved in an incident when he stole porridge in front a passing 
cadre:  
I could no longer control my hunger, and took a few spoons of porridge and 
swallowed them. The unit chief Touch gave me a hard kick and shouted: ‘Seeing 
I was eating you wanted to do so? Want to breathe your last breath?’127 
 
Disobedience took many forms. Many transgressed Angkar’s rigid and cruel rules 
by benefiting from the cover of darkness or the inattention of some guards in order to 
stealthily gain more food from stealing, either literally from the village’s reserves or more 
‘theoretically’ by picking fruits or catching small animals to eat. Acknowledging the 
various risks implied with complaining or presenting a request to Angkar, many chose 
this non-confrontational approach, only feasible if no authority figure was aware of their 
acts.  
They often found imaginative ways to perform such actions. For example, Sinith 
Heng recalled that: ‘Unable to resist hunger, I began to steal food. I climbed coconut 
trees and then used a stick to pierce the skin of the coconut. I did not pick the fruits, as 
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that would leave evidence behind.’128 Hour Chea, when he was responsible for the 
production of palm sugar, woke up every morning to eat enough to sustain him for the 
rest of the day.129 He felt that his actions were betraying the community, but he had 
decided at that point that preserving his health was more important than Communist 
ideals. 
 In some instances, cases of disobedience acted against the integrity of a person’s 
beliefs. For instance, Look Tha, mentioned previously as a former Buddhist monk, 
recalled that he ate every small animal available, from snails to lizards, even if he had 
decided years ago to avoid eating meat ‘because I did not want to kill living beings 
anymore.’130 He also observed that other villagers did the same thing, although they were 
aware that they would be punished severely if caught. Pin Yathay also found it morally 
objectionable to drown a cat and its kittens to eat; he reminisced about how he used to 
make fun of the rumour that Vietnamese would eat cats and dogs: ‘At this point, I did not 
find it funny at all.’131 
 In most cases, whoever was able to secure more food shared their loot with the 
rest of their family. Neou Kim Ann, in order to feed his sick sister in Kampong Cham, cut 
a papaya tree during the regime, but was then arrested and dragged for execution on the 
grounds of destroying Angkar’s property.132 He resisted his arrest and tried to persuade 
the militiaman to free him: ‘Brother Comrade, I cut the papaya tree because it has not 
borne fruits for two years and will not bear any fruit again. If you don’t believe me, 
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please go and see it.’133 While the militiaman left to verify the assertion, Kim Ann was 
left with a guard. Fortunately, he was acquainted with the guard, who then liberated him.  
 In another case, Ma Las, from Battambang, tried to secure some food for her sick 
son. After having obtained leave from the village cadre, she borrowed a bicycle to sneak 
into her former village in order to gather some potatoes.134 She then traded these potatoes 
for palm juice sugar, which was sufficient to improve her son’s health. In Kandal 
province, Chey Phon, who worked as a fisherman, stole some of the fish to bring to his 
wife although he was well aware that ‘Angkar would surely have killed me if they had 
known.’135  
Like these previous examples, cases of disobedience occurred frequently across 
Cambodia and were successful as long as the authorities did not catch the culprit. If such 
was the case, as some stories illustrated, the corresponding punishment varied according 
to the guard, soldier or leader who witnessed the act. In fact, the consequences varied 
greatly: while most cases referred to severe beatings or executions, a few were able to 
persuade the authorities of their innocence or beneficiated from the leniency of the 
authority figure. Even though such outcomes varied, the possibility of death still existed 
and was very much present in the minds of those who transgressed laws to secure more 
food. 
 Disobedience also took a more direct form as confrontation. Despite the risks 
associated with verbal confrontation, a few successful cases led to improvements in their 
situation. Pin Yathay witnessed an incident of peaceful protest in his jungle camp in 
Pursat after a few days of delay in receiving their daily food allowance:  
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Normally, no one would have considered protesting, but this was the last 
drop. On the second day, an incredible event occurred. A few hundred 
new people had organized a peaceful protest in the village, with five 
former lecturers leading them, to protest the lack of food. The rations 
arrived the next day, but a week after this event, the five teachers and a 
few villagers disappeared.136 
 
As this event illustrated, protest against the Khmer Rouge existed, and could even 
be successful in achieving its goals. However, this demonstration occurred at the 
beginning of the regime, thus the villagers, comprising mostly of new people, were not 
yet aware of the practices of the Khmer Rouge and their treatment of opposition. In fact, 
there was no clearly stated law or rule against protest, and Cambodians had to deduct the 
implications of their actions after witnessing some ruthless event or disappearances. 
Another case of confrontation at the beginning of the regime involved Chhay Rin, an 
elderly street vendor from Phnom Penh, who soon after her deportation in the Northwest 
asked to the soldiers: ‘My children, there are only bushes. There is nothing but tree leaves 
to eat, so why did you bring me here?’137 She was subsequently brought for execution for 
insulting Angkar, but survived the blows.  
In another account of direct confrontation, Vilboreth Bou recalled how his mother 
interrupted a speech given by a Khmer Rouge cadre to criticize the regime: ‘You live as a 
king and we live as slaves. Is this equal? Do these people here have anything to do with 
tycoons when they are starving to death?’138 The listeners kept silent after her 
interruption, aware that she had signed her death warrant by pronouncing these words. As 
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a matter of fact, she was immediately brought to a killing pit along with her young son. 
Yet the following developments did not occur as expected: on the verge of being killed, a 
Khmer Rouge soldier named Sok suddenly opened fire on the Khmer Rouge leader. He 
had been a student of Vilboreth’s mother and refused to kill her, and chose to turn his 
weapon towards his superior, then asked his former teacher for forgiveness. While this 
story - if true - was quite unrepresentative of many events of the Khmer Rouge regime, it 
would illustrate how Khmer Rouge soldiers could have a choice in carrying out 
executions or resisting themselves, and as such, ‘obeying orders’ were not a sufficient 
excuse for the actions taken during the regime. 
Despite the risk of execution associated with direct confrontation, there were 
indeed many of such incidences, although the stories elaborated above represent a 
minority of Cambodians who survived, largely through the intervention of Khmer Rouge 
leaders. As stated in the first chapter, an official’s decisions and application of rules 
depended largely on his or her convictions, which fluctuated greatly between many 
cadres. Considering the risk associated with such confrontation, other Cambodians found 
alternative means to denounce injustices without jeopardizing their lives.  
Pom Sarun, working in a hospital in Phnom Penh, witnessed corruption among 
some doctors and nurses, thus had decided to write an anonymous letter to the 
responsible of the hospital by sliding a note under the pillow of his daughter.139 As a 
result of this action, the staff engaging in corruption was sent to work in a cooperative. 
Her act seems relatively benign, but this type of denunciation and this display of literacy 
were sufficient to at least send her to reeducation. Nevertheless, the anonymity of the 
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message reduced the chances of retribution, unlike the more public affirmations discussed 
above. 
Hour Chea, finding himself enrolled in the navy towards the end of the regime, 
witnessed another denunciation. A Khmer Rouge friend, named Sarat, denounced the 
company of soldiers and its chief during a meeting. The previous day, he had written a 
denunciation letter to their superior, thus fifteens yotheas were sent into a disciplinary 
regiment.140 As seen with these examples, confrontation was indeed possible and existed 
during the regime. However, its extent was limited and the repercussions for the open 
complaints were often met with drastic measures. Yet, these few acts of resistance were 
successful in disrupting policy implementation, even if the effects were only on a small 
scale. Such notion dispels the impossibility of peaceful resistance during the Khmer 
Rouge regime, and the success of these denunciations again reinforces the notion of 
difference amongst the Khmer Rouge rulers.  
 
The Nightmare of Krauchmar: Violent Resistance and Rebellions 
 
 While a few researchers studied the existence of open resistance, they interpreted 
their significance differently. In his research on the first case of spontaneous resistance 
against the Khmer Rouge, Ysa Osman documented the uprisings of Krauchmar district in 
the Kampong Cham province. These events occurred following the Hari Raya of October 
1975 and are commonly referred to as the ‘Cham Rebellion.’ In short, after this 
announcement of the suspension of religious rights of these devout Muslims and the 
planned arrest of three of the leaders in the island village of Koh Phal, the villagers took 
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part in an uprising decided for the next day. For this purpose, various Chams unearthed 
their swords and gathered their knives to fight off a Khmer Rouge invasion. However, 
with their trained forces and heavy weaponry, the Khmer Rouge defeated the resistance 
fairly easily at the cost of many rebels’ lives. Afterwards, the villagers were dispersed 
and several participants were jailed. 
 Echoing the events of the nearby village of Koh Phal, the Chams of Svay Khleang 
also fomented an uprising against the Khmer Rouge. With the suddenness of their attack, 
they were able to secure an old rifle and an automatic weapon from a Khmer Rouge 
soldier. Furthermore, the population of Svay Khleang was much greater than Koh Phal. 
As a result, the following battle proved more costly to the Khmer Rouge, who lost an 
estimated hundred troops.141 Yet even in this case, the villagers suffered 
disproportionately, and the great majority of the rebels either died during the battle or 
after a sojourn in jail. Osman unfortunately does not provide an analysis of the many 
interviews transcribed in his book. He simply acknowledges that his book ‘offers 
multiple perspectives on the shared experience of Cham Muslims in Kroch Chhmar 
district and elsewhere in Cambodia.’142  
 In Kiernan’s book, The Pol Pot Regime, the events in Krauchmar constitute the 
cornerstone of his main argument about the preeminence ethnic cleansing during the 
Khmer Rouge regime. He articulates his approach by highlighting that official CPK 
documents did not acknowledge the existence of the Cham ethnic group, or ‘worse, the 
Chams were also, potentially, a weak link in the CPK state. With their distinct language 
and culture, large villages, and independent national organizational networks, the Chams 
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probably seemed a threat to the atomized, closely supervised society that the Center 
planned.’143 In order to deal with this threat, the Khmer Rouge imposed anti-religious 
policies, and as Kiernan argues, their relocation into distant regions testifies to the 
attempt to eradicate the Chams as a culture.  
However, the problem with the argument of the Center singling out the Chams as 
an ethnic group is the Party’s anti-religion and displacement policies were imposed 
nationally on all Cambodians, and not only the Chams. Vickery acknowledges that 
Chams suffered under the Khmer Rouge and that a Khmer disposition against them could 
have resulted in more violence against their group during the regime, but he deems the 
ethnic cleansing claim to be speculative, considering that some Chams even served the 
rebellion.144 Vickery also added that the practice to make them eat pork could also be 
circumstantial rather than intended, considering that pork is the main source of meat in 
Cambodia. The major difference with other uprisings and resistance was that the right to 
practice their religion was a powerful motivator for the Cham rebellion. For instance, Lep 
Vanmoth cited Khmer Rouge’s policies of making Chams ‘raise swine in the mosque, 
make women cut their hair and seize and burn the Quran’ as major reasons behind the 
uprising.145    
 Margaret Slocomb’s Chikreng Rebellion: Coup and Its Aftermath in Democratic 
Kampuchea presents another perspective on resistance. The event occurred in April 1977, 
two years after the Cham rebellions, and at the other side of the country, in the Chikreng 
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district of the Northwestern province of Siem Reap.146 A purge of the leaders and soldiers 
of the Northern Zone, following an accusation of treason on Koy Thuon occurred a few 
months before the uprising. Ta Sok, Sorn and Rom, cadres from Takeo in the Southwest, 
replaced the district leader in Chikreng.147 They subsequently started an anti-Khmer 
Rouge campaign in their district, inciting the peasants to rebel against Angkar for the lack 
of food and its extreme policies. After a few months of agitation, a rebellion occurred 
across the district and a few Khmer Rouge local cadres and base people during the 
rebellion. The former agitators, namely Ta Sok and Ta Sorn, arrested the demonstrators 
the next day, and they executed the demonstrators on the accusation of treason. As the 
author concluded: 
What happened to the villagers there, and the other ‘base people’ whom they 
killed, was simply manipulation of their desire to taste freedom (daumbei si 
sereipheap) as one villager said, a cynical ploy to have one group destroy a 
target group that was already doomed and, by so doing, to reveal the first group 
as another target, like moving ducks in a shooting gallery.148 
 
In Chikreng, according to Slocomb, the Khmer Rouge manipulated the peasants 
in order to intervene and replace the purged leadership with more ‘loyal’ soldiers from 
the Southwest. In fact, this view casts some doubt on the ‘spontaneity’ of the rebellion in 
the Krauchmar district as well. After all, unlike their usual policy of arresting and 
executing leaders through deceit, the Khmer Rouge leadership informed the village of its 
intentions to arrest all the leaders at once. Therefore, the village had time to prepare and 
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protest, thus may have unwillingly acted in the interests of the Angkar Loeu’s 
consolidation of power for this particular region. 
 With time, the greatest threat to the regime came from within its own ranks in the 
forms of rebelling Khmer Rouge and freedom fighters, known as Khmer Rumdos. The 
Khmer Rouge initially comprised of different leaders with their own perception on the 
application of communism in Cambodia. For instance, many did not agree with the 
evacuation of cities and devaluation of money. Yet, the Angkar Loeu pressed ahead 
regardless of the opposition and decided to methodically remove this opposition 
throughout the regime. Oft-quoted reasons for rebels were the immediate threat posed by 
Pol Pot’s clique’s centralist policies; this group sent many cadres through the gates of 
Tuol Sleng and replaced these cadres with troops from the Southwest, the most loyal to 
Pol Pot. In unsuccessful captures or assassinations, the target officials and troops often 
had to turn against the center to protect themselves.  
Nevertheless, even though the motives for resistance for the Khmer Rouge varied 
from the base and new people involved in disobedience and confrontation, the issue of 
starvation was also important in motivating the Khmer Rouge to act against the highest 
authorities. Prak Yoeun, a Khmer Rouge soldier stationed in Kampong Cham, heard his 
superior Oeun say: ‘We must topple this regime, it’s a starving regime. We must create a 
regime wearing colored shirts.’149 Pin Yathay also reported a reference to a new regime 
of ‘colored shirts’ while he was in the western province of Pursat. He first met a base 
person sharing his disillusionment of the regime, then learned about the experience of one 
of his friends.150 His friend received the visit of a base person desiring to purchase 
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colored clothing, ‘at any price’. The demand seemed unusual since base people usually 
wanted suits or dark clothing, since colored clothing was forbidden during the regime; the 
villager thus conceded his identity as a chhlop and explained his intentions:   
The Khmer Rouge are not all the same. [...] I, for instance, do not believe in this 
society of misery and forced labour. You should not condemn all the Khmer 
Rouge. [...] The regime will not hold for long. You know why we need coloured 
clothes. When the time comes, those wearing them will be on your side.151 
 
 Ou Daov, a commando for the Khmer Rouge, received a visit from his cousin 
Yean in the neighboring province of Koh Kong.152 His cousin was also a commander and 
advised him: ‘Younger brother, please try to stay alive here for a while. When we arrive 
in Phnom Penh, we will set up a coup against Pol Pot. So you should act cautiously and 
convince people to join with us.’ After waiting for a few months, he heard that Angkar 
had prevented this brewing revolt in a bloodbath. Kiernan mentioned that other attempts 
of rebellion against Pol Pot occurred the following year, in the north and the eastern 
Cambodia.153 In fact, officials of the Khmer Rouge planned rebellions against Pol Pot in 
different areas of Cambodia by, but had been repeatedly suppressed by internal purges.  
 Kiernan, first in the Pol Pot Regime, then in Genocide and Resistance in 
Southeast Asia, focused particularly on the rebellions in the Eastern Zone fomented by 
former Khmer Rouge. Following Angkar Loeu’s suspicion of the Eastern Zone and the 
Khmer Rouge’s defeat in the hands of the Vietnamese, the Center started to take 
measures against their cadres: as many as 409 Khmer Rouge cadres from the Eastern 
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Zone had been sent to Tuol Sleng by April 1978.154 When the leader of the Eastern Zone, 
So Phim, went to Phnom Penh to negotiate with Pol Pot, he was greeted by two ferries 
loaded with Khmer Rouge forces who opened fired on him155 He escaped and committed 
suicide as the combined troops of Mok, Ke Pauk and Son Sen invaded his territory.156 
This started the rebellion against Angkar in the Eastern Zone and the flight of many 
Khmer Rouge forces to Vietnam.  
 Other interviews corroborated these events. Mat Ly, previously a Cham leader of 
the Eastern Zone, was demoted in 1975 in favor of So Phim. During the regime, climbed 
the ranks and became Vice-Secretary of Tbaung Khun district.157 In this position, he was 
able to assemble a small force of 300 men and attempted to ambush Pol Pot in the forest 
of Dambor district, but his plan was unsuccessful.158 Ou Daov, mentioned above, was 
remobilized to fight against the Vietnamese in 1978. In the wading last weeks of the 
Khmer Rouge reign, he claimed to have shot at a commander and organized a force of 
1,000 men to fight Pol Pot’s troops.159 However, as only three soldiers decided to stay 
under his command, he decided to flee to the north of the country. 
 
Freedom Fighters and Resistance 
 
 Some non-Khmer Rouge also took up arms and assumed the role of freedom 
fighters operating from forests and border areas. Bun Thad, a peasant refugee from 
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Battambang, volunteered to join such forces in Thailand.160 Once in the jungle, he 
recounted that the resistance force numbered around a hundred men:  ‘My first job was to 
go to the border with 12 people to fight with the Communists, and in that battle 7 people 
got killed.’161 On his second mission, he had to dig a trench in Preah Vihear province 
across a mined field, and three fellow soldiers died after stepping on mines. After those 
inconclusive experiences, he chose to escape from the freedom fighters and make his way 
back to Thailand.  
 In Eastern Cambodia, such ‘freedom fighters’ were Khmer Rouge having 
defected during the doomed 1978 offensive against Vietnam. Kiernan noted that around 
two thousand troops led by future president Heng Samrin undertook sporadic attacks 
across the border since July of the same year.162 The rebels mentioned by Ou Daov were 
of another breed: former citizens of Democratic Kampuchea having fled their country and 
formed small groups to retaliate against the Khmer Rouge along the Thai border. 
Nevertheless, none of these forces were successful in challenging central authority. 
Without Vietnam’s massive intervention, violent Khmer resistance was unlikely to 
operate any significant change in the political structure of Cambodia. Even though some 
chose the path of open resistance, the general impact of this choice seemed limited in 
practice. Whereas plots and violent conflict against the Khmer Rouge did not produce the 
desired effects, more subtle and understated forms of resistances were more effective in 
producing change and undermining Khmer Rouge power. 
                                                 
160
 Bun Thad, Beyond the Killing Fields: Voices of Nine Cambodian Survivors in America, Usha 
Welaratna, ed. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993) 120. 
161
 Ibid.  
162
 Kiernan 1994: 440. 
 80
In reflecting upon the perception of the Chikreng rebellion in academia, Slocomb 
witnessed a discrepancy between ‘the spirit and motivation evoked by the English term 
“rebellion” as Western historians had reasonably termed the event, and the actual nature 
and cause of what the people themselves recalled with shame and regret as patekam, a 
demonstration.’163 She then deducts that the more pessimistic view from the locals could 
be the result of the subsequent brutal repression and the realization that the Center 
engineered the uprising itself.  
Whether these events are recalled with glory and pride, or rather with shame and 
grief, depends primarily on the perception of its witness. In several Western works on the 
Khmer Rouge, ‘resistance’ is often assumed to signify a righteous struggle against the 
unspeakable evil that represented the Khmer Rouge regime. Yet, like the different 
motivations of the Khmer Rouge volunteers, these rebels may not have been necessarily 
motivated solely with ideals of freedom or a vision of ‘appropriate’ socialism. In fact, 
Khmer Rouge troops often chose to oppose the regime when they realized that the Center 
was adopting radical measures to centralize more power or that the desperate attacks 
against Vietnam would eventually lead to their demise. Opportunism was present on both 
sides of the conflict. Finally, one fact has emerged from these different stories: 
Cambodians from different origins had the choice to resist, despite the overwhelming 
disincentives against them, and the majority of instances of resistance involved self-
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Chapter 5-Escape: Boundaries and Movement 
 
 The previously discussed actions of cooperation and resistance, while useful in 
surviving the regime, did not ensure a person’s complete security until the Khmer 
Rouge’s demise. In contrast, a more definitive solution with higher risk was flight from 
the regime’s grasp. Since such decision directly contravened the Angkar’s definite 
policies against their subjects’ displacements, the punishment associated with escape was 
severe: in cases of internal escape, imprisonment was the usual punishment, and in cases 
of attempts of crossing the border, execution was the rule. Escape is thus a form of 
resistance since it requires an infringement of rules, but its motives and conduct were 
usually quite distinct: flight often arose from the belief of eventual execution, while 
resistance had more diverse motives ranging from hunger to discontent with the 
government. 
 If the definition is only limited to ‘flight to another country,’ the few qualifying 
cases would not be representative of a larger social occurrence. However, within 
Cambodia itself, the incidences of voluntary internal displacement were relatively quite 
common. This chapter will elaborate on the different aspects of escape, both external and 
internal; the pervasiveness and success of internal escape reveals two important aspects 
of the regime: that internal displacement was sufficient to avoid execution and that it was 
only be possible with a relative decentralization of Democratic Kampuchea’s 
bureaucracy.  
The first section briefly describes Khmer Rouge policies associated with 
surveillance and control of relocated Cambodians. At the height of the Khmer Rouge 
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regime, relatively few Cambodians successfully crossed the borders of their homeland.164 
Furthermore, their success was contingent on the policies of these countries towards 
Cambodian refugees.165 Despite these strict rules and overwhelming obstacles, some 
Cambodians still attempted to escape the grasp of Angkar by fleeing the country.  
 The next section follows the cases of Cambodians who decided to leave their 
country during the regime. After the regime’s collapse, a number of Cambodians decided 
to flee the incoming Vietnamese, and sometimes – voluntarily or otherwise – followed 
the Khmer Rouge to their refuges along the Thai border. In those instances, life under the 
Khmer Rouge did not end along with the Vietnamese invasion: they had to evade Angkar 
in the several months following the Khmer Rouge retreat.  
Finally, the last section examines the more frequent and generally smaller-scale 
instances of internal displacement arising from different motives. Internal displacement 
often appeared to be motivated by the necessity of fleeing imminent execution. Even if 
their lives were directly threatened, it was often sufficient to find the protection of a 
village chief from another location, rather than exiting the country. In a few cases, 
relocation was rather motivated by the need to improve one’s chances of survival, often 
concerned with access to food and protection from disease. 
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Decisions and Perceptions 
 
The Cambodians were in a position to flee at critical times before and after the 
Khmer Rouge victory over the Lon Nol forces. Many urbanites decided to leave before 
the inevitable fall of Phnom Penh. Members of a household debated about the decision to 
stay or leave the country. Their perception of the Khmer Rouge and their idea of living in 
a country other than Cambodia helped guiding their decision. In any case, following the 
harsh and unforgiving living conditions and high mortality rate of the Khmer Rouge 
regime, those who had successfully argued to stay in Cambodia often bitterly felt the 
weight of their decision.  
After the Khmer Rouge gained power, the prospects of living under the 
Communist government, were not relevant in their decision-making anymore, as the 
consequences soon became obvious. Rather, the difficulty of the obstacles and chances of 
success were foremost in the minds of those who decided to leave the country. As the 
mass exodus from Cambodia after the collapse of the Khmer Rouge attested, many 
Cambodians had harboured desires to leave. However, not all escape was necessarily 
carefully deliberated or planned, and some who left to reach the promise of a better life 
elsewhere were never seen again. Youk Chhang, current director of the DC-Cam, decided 
not to escape on the basis that his uncle had attempted to reach Thailand, but was never 
seen again afterwards.166 
Their perception of the neighbouring countries – Laos, Vietnam and Thailand – 
played a role in the decision of the destination, even if these countries as such were not 
the ultimate goal of these political refugees: those who had previously studied, worked or 
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knew relatives in Europe or North America wished to reach these countries for safety. 
Hence, Vietnam or Thailand were sometimes chosen for their chance of eventually 
reaching other countries. 
Information from outside Cambodia was virtually unavailable, but a few fortunate 
new people had kept their radios hidden and updated their knowledge by listening mostly 
to the Voice of America. Pin Yathay, for instance, had been planning to leave Cambodia 
from the beginning of the regime and tended to take decisions according to the likelihood 
of a successful evasion. Therefore, during the evacuation, he first headed south, as close 
as possible to the Vietnamese border in the province of Takeo. Eventually, using his radio 
furtively, he learnt that South Vietnam had fallen into the hands of the Communists, thus 
that any attempt to reach a third – capitalist – country would then be tenuous. His doubts 
were also confirmed during a discussion with a Khmer Rouge cadre who told him: ‘You 
surely know that Vietnam is not completely revolutionary...’167 From this discussion, he 
learned about the strained relation between Cambodia and Vietnam, thus decided to 
rather use every opportunity to be relocated closer to Thailand.  
On the other hand, Moeung Sonn, another foreign-educated engineer, did not aim 
to escape to Thailand: ‘First, I did not want to live in Thailand, the land of all the shady 
trafficking. Further, I had all my business in Kampong Som, with little in the way of cash 
in hand, gold or jewellery. Especially, I was not the least afraid of a country controlled by 
the Khmer Rouge, under the moral sponsorship of Sihanouk.’168 From this last quote, we 
can trace several elements important to the decision of staying in Cambodia. The first one 
being the perception of foreign countries, informed through personal experience and 
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knowledge. In this particular case, Moeung Sonn worked at the refinery in Kampong 
Som (Sihanoukville), the main seaport of Cambodia. From his position, he witnessed the 
corruption and smuggling involving Thailand. Second, he had a practical understanding 
of the implications of moving outside Cambodia: some form of wealth was required for 
subsistence across borders, and if wealth was lacking, the comfort and social status of the 
new people were markedly lower. Third, the perception of the Khmer Rouge was very 
important in determining the final decision in leaving the country. In all fairness, it would 
have been difficult to foresee that the Khmer Rouge regime in times of peace proved far 
more destructive than the simultaneous civil war and large-scale bombings of their 
country. Hence, even the Cambodians who considered the Khmer Rouge as a threat could 
not foresee how much of a threat Angkar revealed itself to be. 
In fact, many families debated how they should react to the imminent Khmer 
Rouge victory. For example, Nguon Hou, from a relatively well-off family in Phnom 
Penh, recalled the argument between his parents on that topic: 
My father and older brother came up with an idea that my family should move to 
the States, as they foreseen [sic] the KR would defeat the Lon Nol government 
and slaughter people. But my mother disagreed and refused to leave her 
birthplace. She added that the KR waged war only with the aim of liberating the 
country and would not kill people.169 
 
 Some decisions were made quite in extremis, as by Area Cheat Ponnary’s parents, 
who were on a ship on April 17th headed towards Thailand with Lon Nol soldiers.170 But 
his father decided just before leaving that he preferred remaining in Cambodia. A 
combination of their perceived threat of the Khmer Rouge and their attachment to 
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Cambodia determined their ultimate decision. Serey Len Deour’s father refused to join 
his brother, Cambodian Ambassador to Japan, for this single reason: ‘There is no better 
country to live in than ours.’171 Crowds of elated Cambodians rejoicing at the end of the 
war greeted the Khmer Rouge in their entrance in Phnom Penh. Some greeted them 
reluctantly, but most were genuine in their reception of the Khmer Rouge and their relief 
in the end of the war. 
During Democratic Kampuchea, the proximity of these countries in relation to the 
location of the work camps or villages provided an opportunity for escape. Cambodians 
relocated to frontier provinces were thus understandably more likely to cross borders than 
those inland. For instance, most refugees to Thailand came from Battambang, and 
provinces close to Vietnam, such as Takeo, Svey Rieng or Kampong Cham, were the 
origin of many refugees to that country. However, considering the tense political climate 
and eventual fighting between Democratic Kampuchea and Vietnam, finding refuge in 
Vietnam was rarer during that period, with the exception of the exodus from the Eastern 
Zone after purges. Kiernan, for instance, documented that on four days in July 1975, 
2,400 Cambodians crossed the border from Battambang province to Aranyaprathet, and 




In their attempt to enforce total control over the Cambodian society, Khmer 
Rouge leaders implemented a series of drastic policies pertaining to the geographical 
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distribution and surveillance of its citizens. The first of such policies was the evacuation 
of all cities, a decision voluntarily unprecedented in ‘Communist’ history.173 Once in 
those work camps and villages, these Cambodians were often relocated and reassigned to 
other camps or even distant regions. Beside these mandatory relocations, population 
movement was strictly prohibited. The village chief or unit leader had to authorize any 
displacement with a written travel permit. Universal travel permits were also necessary 
for the Khmer Rouge soldiers themselves. The phrase ‘prison without walls’ often 
epitomized the situation during this period.174 
From biographies and the numerous accounts recalling attempts to cross the 
border, the obstacles to reach safely the other side of the frontier were numerous and 
often deadly. Within Cambodia itself, Khmer Rouge forces were constantly patrolling the 
highways and major routes, in addition to the already pervasive surveillance apparatus 
within each community. Considering such heavy surveillance, the most common routes 
to reach safely other countries were through heavily forested mountains. In order to reach 
Thailand, a common route from the southwest or west of the country was through the 
Cardamom Mountains. The journey would take weeks, even for the better-equipped 
Khmer Rouge who fled the Vietnamese invasion in 1979.175 The lack of food, 
unwelcoming terrain, confusing directions and sparse Khmer Rouge camps made this 
particular journey very difficult to accomplish.  
At the border itself, the concentration of permanent troops was high and the 
Khmer Rouge took additional measures to secure the border. A portion of the forested 
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area was densely mined, barbed wire fences covered some areas and hidden sharpened 
bamboo stakes completed the measures preventing border crossing. While the stakes 
were not deadly as such, it would take considerable time to clear a safe path while being 
in a vulnerable position, even more so if such obstacles had wounded the escapee.176 
Finally, in case of capture, execution was the implemented policy, and after incredibly 
exhausting journeys, the captives were unlikely to escape this fate. 
In some provinces in the east, crossing to Vietnam was relatively more 
straightforward, depending on the proximity of the border and the presence of deterrents. 
Bopha, for instance, recalled that ‘in the forest, we lived very close to the Vietnam 
border. Some people escaped to Vietnam by pretending to fish and swimming across the 
river, and my brother, sisters and I planned to swim across too. But I fell ill with malaria, 
and we were forced to stay in the jungle.’177  
 Once on the other side in either country, the Cambodian refugees’ safety was not 
yet assured. For instance, Thailand, after an inflow of refugees reaching its borders as 
early as July and August 1975, sent officers to negotiate the repatriation of these refugees 
with the Khmer Rouge, who then accepted to receive them.178 Vietnam’s policies toward 
refugees changed drastically during that period. At the beginning of the regime, when 
Vietnam tried to maintain cordial relations with Democratic Kampuchea, their policy 
towards refugees was intransigent: Chanda learned later that ‘during the first five months 
after the ‘liberation’ of Phnom Penh, more than 150,000 destitute Vietnamese had 
flooded the Dong Thap, An Giang, and Tay Ninh provinces. The Vietnamese were 
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allowed to stay, but refugees of Chinese and Khmer descent were forced back.’179 The 
non-Vietnamese Cambodians were thus likely executed upon their return. 
 However, the relations between Cambodia and Vietnam worsened following 
Khmer Rouge plans to ‘reacquire’ Kampuchea Krom, on the grounds that it represented 
former Cambodian territory. The Vietnamese nevertheless attempted to use refugees as 
exchange chips in order to soothe the straining relations between both countries.180 
Chanda took note of such an exchange: ‘In one such operation in early 1977, the 
Vietnamese provincial official authorities allowed the Khmer Rouge to select forty-nine 
refugees from a camp in Moc Hoa to be taken back in exchange for one bull per 
person.’181 Yet since 1975, the Vietnamese government had been tacitly accepting around 
300,000 Cambodian refugees. 
 In mid-77, the Khmer Rouge attacked the Vietnamese border.182 As the Khmer 
Rouge skirmished across the border and attacked bordering towns in Vietnam with 
mortar, the tension between both countries mounted and Vietnam became more overtly 
welcoming to Cambodian refugees. In August 1978, Cambodian rebel troops found a way 
to breach the border, while it was previously ‘hard to contact Vietnam, because there 
were mines.’183 Samrin later claimed that as many as 10,000 evacuees crossed the border 
at that time. In late September, he estimated that the total number of refugees numbered 
40,000. Chea Sim, also interviewed by Kiernan, added ‘we all went together, after seeing 
that if we didn’t we would be killed.’ Finally, the Vietnamese army assisted 60,000 
                                                 
179
 Chanda: 16. 
180




 Kiernan: 359. 
183
 Heng Samrin, interview from Ben Kiernan, Genocide and Resistance in Southeast Asia: Documentation, 
Denial and Justice in Cambodia and East Timor, (Edison, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2008) 102. 
 90
Cambodians in seeking refuge in Vietnam  after their punitive expedition of December 
1977. The Vietnamese government then requested assistance from the United Nation 
High Commission for Refugees.184 
 These examples of policies illustrated how opportunities for escape were 
contingent on the geographical location of the escapees and the rapidly shifting foreign 
policy of Thailand and Vietnam concerning the fate of refugees. Yet, while the Khmer 
Rouge deployed all the measures at their disposal, some escapees nevertheless succeeded 
to overcome these obstacles, as the following section will discuss. 
 
Escape Artists: A Few Cases of Cambodian Refugees before 1979 
 
In one of the early instances of escape to another country during Democratic 
Kampuchea, Saleh Mein explained how he fled the scene of the Cham rebellion on Koh 
Phal.185 He had participated actively in the rebellion as a combatant, but at the end of the 
clash, he was suffering from head wounds. Along with eight other rebels, he decided to 
escape the Khmer Rouge on a boat towards Vietnam. However, because of his wounds, 
the others were reticent in letting him join their group. He finally convinced them to 
throw him in the Mekong if he was to loudly shout in pain or died while on the boat. 
 They left Koh Phal at night, thus were not noticed by the Khmer Rouge guarding 
the island. In the next few days of their trip on the mighty river, they stopped on deserted 
islands during the day to sleep and gather some food. They had evaded the Khmer Rouge 
successfully, but once on the border between Vietnam and Cambodia, many armed patrol 
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boats were scouting the area with searchlights. An unpredictable occurrence allowed 
them to pass three groups of patrols: one of their passengers was caught with a fit of 
coughing while they were gliding through the silent waters. When one of Mein’s 
comrades intended to slit his throat, they noticed that the echoes of the coughing drew the 
patrols away from the center of the river towards the banks of the river, thus far from the 
escapees. Ultimately, they were able to reach Vietnam and were fed by a Cham villager 
on their arrival. 
 In another case later in the regime, in the region of Battambang, Bun Thab also 
escaped the Khmer Rouge, this time towards Thailand.186 He had been tied up with two 
of his friends, waiting for impending execution. When heavy rain started falling, his 
friends and him decided to run away. He hid in a banana grove, and Khmer Rouge 
seeking for them could not see him under the cover of darkness and tropical rain. He 
found his friends again. Before the start of their journey toward Thailand, they stopped at 
one of his friend’s house to gather a homemade lighter and some food for the journey. 
They then set out in an approximate direction of Thailand: ‘The monk knew from old 
stories that Thailand was to the north of our country, so we began going in that 
direction.’187 Once at the border, Khmer Rouge guards saw the group and shot one of his 
friends. Yet, he was still managed to cross the border and some Thai peasants offered 
them food. 
 Finally, Pin Yathay’s numerous attempts and successful flight from his country 
provide another insightful example of escape. As mentioned earlier, he had decided to 
escape Cambodia from the onset of the regime, but his initial plan of crossing to Vietnam 
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was foiled by the strained relationship between the two countries. As a result, he decided 
to move within Cambodia as close to Thailand as possible. To reach that goal, he 
volunteered to be displaced and his family was sent to the province of Pursat. From the 
jungle camp there, he first attempted to leave Cambodia in 1976 with other families. 
However, this plan failed when one of their group members decided to quit when faced 
with an unexpected wide river barred them from advancing. When his identity was 
discovered and he learned about the planned execution, he decided to leave with his wife 
to reach the previous jungle base where they used to live. Even though their escape was 
successful, they had to take the decision to leave their last remaining child in the care of a 
Chinese woman.  
Finally, he planned his final escape through the Cardamom Mountains with his 
wife and other friends who wanted to join them. During the preparatory stage, they 
amassed as much provisions as possible through stealing and bartering, surveyed the 
areas and discussed the best route to take. Despite this well-planned expedition, on the 
first day of their departure, they unfortunately met a Khmer Rouge patrol and their group 
was subsequently divided. During the few weeks of his trek though the jungle, he 
eventually lost his wife and her friend, and all his provisions. When he emerged from the 
forest, Khmer Rouge soldiers apprehended him at the border. While they fed and 
interrogated him, he pretended to act stupid, although he was well aware that they would 
execute him the next day. Fortunately, a sudden storm and loosely tied ropes allowed him 
to break out from his confinement during the same evening and reach Thailand in June 
1977. His freedom and survival proved costly: during the regime and his escape, he had 
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lost his entire family, and despite careful planning, luck ultimately allowed him to 
survive this ordeal. 
As enthralling as the stories from the likes of Saleh Mein, Boun Thab, Pin Yathay 
or Dith Pran are, flight from Cambodia was relatively rare during the regime in 
comparison with instances of internal escape.188  However, it is important to acknowledge 
these events, since they represent how some Cambodians willingly chose to overcome 
overwhelming odds in what they perceived to be the most effective way to survive the 
Khmer Rouge regime. 
 
Desertion and Internal Escape 
 
 As stated earlier, instances of internal escape represented a large share of the 
cases of escape in its different aspects. This type of escape tends to be overlooked, 
possibly because refugee status is only granted according to the UN Convention relating 
to the Status of Refugees.189 Without crossing the imaginary lines between nations, 
Cambodians still sought to escape Khmer Rouge control, sometimes by taking refuge in 
natural areas shielding them from interferences, namely dense jungles and mountains. 
Some also avoided the Khmer Rouge by relocating themselves within Cambodia. This 
last point is significant in reinforcing the relative decentralization of Khmer Rouge rule: 
ultimately, the decision of whether a refugee would be accepted or rejected lay in the 
hands of the village chief.  
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 The first instances of internal escape were within the ranks of the Khmer Rouge 
organization itself. During the civil war, the Khmer Rouge’s young recruits, willingly or 
otherwise, were confronted to the brutal reality of war, and many wished to quit.190 Nhem 
Sal, for instance, was a young Cambodian conscripted in the revolutionary army and 
feared being killed on the battlefield.191 While on patrol in Mondulkiri province, he saw 
many corpses in a valley: ‘I recognized most of them as my former comrades, who had 
been sent to work at a different location just days before.’192 He then immediately 
decided to return to his village, in fear of losing his life as well. On his way, he 
encountered a few comrades who were equally deserting the Khmer Rouge, and they 
soon formed a little band of seven. They traveled during a month, but were finally 
apprehended close to Kampong Cham. From there, they were sent to S-21 in Phnom 
Penh. However, after their interrogation, they were transferred to a lesser prison. 
 Apart from fearing being killed during battle, some Khmer Rouge resented being 
separated from their families for so long. As the soldiers were rarely permitted to visit 
their village, they often formulated during the civil war and the duration of the Khmer 
Rouge government. Sey Sok, another young soldier, went to great lengths to return to his 
village after serving the Khmer Rouge for a year.193 The interviewer noted that ‘he risked 
his life to return home because he really missed his parents.’194 He left with a friend who 
came from the village, and both were captured and escaped thrice during their long 
journey. From Kampong Cham, they reached their village in Siem Reap, on the other side 
                                                 
190
 See Chapter 1. 
191








of the country, where Sok was able to remain for five months, but after that time he was 
sent to a construction site with his unit until the end of the regime. 
 In the accounts used for this research, the usual punishment for desertion did not 
seem particularly severe. Local leaders formulated threats against the deserters or their 
families, but the consequences were far less disastrous than being accused of treason or 
learning that a family member used to live in a city. In fact, desertion appeared to be a 
rampant problem for the Khmer Rouge. Yet, as Angkar Loeu strengthened its grip on 
power, Khmer Rouge cadres and soldiers were being purged and desertion occurred for 
different reasons. 
 After years of loyal services for Angkar in Phnom Penh, Neth, a former Khmer 
Rouge soldier, was arrested in 1977 for being under the orders of So Phim, the secretary 
of the Eastern Zone, now considered a traitor.195 He was then brought to a killing pit 
along with about fifty other soldiers who were beaten then stabbed three times one after 
the other. Neth was the fifth. He was still fortunate to survive his wounds, along with his 
friend. They applied mud to their wounds and searched for food. They subsequently ran 
away and Neth was appointed militiaman by the villagers in some mountainous area, 
where the Khmer Rouge would not find him again. 
 Neth’s story was uncommon for Khmer Rouge soldiers, but other Cambodians 
survived massacres and then escaped the surroundings of the event. If they had remained 
on location or returned to their village, they would be sent for execution again as the 
executors often double-checked the identity of the casualties to determine if everyone had 
been ‘smashed’ as planned. Chhay Rin, the old lady who protested in the precious 
chapter, regained consciousness after the attempted execution, then joined a mobile unit 
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nearby.196 Him Man, a Cham villager, left a procession of Chams on their way to be 
executed by hiding in nearby bushes with his wife.197 They stayed in these bushes and the 
nearby pond for nearly three months, avoiding the Khmer Rouge’s searches and feeding 
on what they could find. Finally, driven by hunger, they were caught by the Khmer 
Rouge. However, the latter decided not to kill them, for the time being.  
At the beginning of the regime, Savuth Penn’s father, a Lon Nol officer, was 
summoned by the Khmer Rouge to ‘greet the King’.198 Instead, he and other officers were 
asked to stand in formation, then the Khmer Rouge opened fire on them. Penn’s father 
survived with a bullet passing through his right arm and a few bullets hitting his skull. He 
managed to crawl back to his village, where is family greeted him. Pressured by Khmer 
Rouge threats to execute any person hiding an enemy, his family debated at length on the 
measure to deal with the situation. Shunning away plans of poisoning her father, hiding 
him permanently or helping him flee to Thailand, his brother-in-law decided to alert the 
authorities, who then made sure that he would not escape again. 
 During the commonplace executions of the regime, those who were fortunate 
enough to survive this ordeal had to escape the location of the event and find some 
refuge. From these stories, refuge rarely took the form of another country, but rather 
mostly other villages or natural shelters within Cambodia. Before such execution could 
occur, some Cambodians had the chance to receive the information about their impending 
execution from some informant, and subsequently flee in time. Pin’s second escape was 
motivated from learning that Khmer Rouge soldiers would wait a week to see if disease 
would kill him, otherwise they would execute him themselves. 
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 Pu Ma, a young mother now refugee in the United States, was also fortunate to 
receive such information: ‘When we were walking, the good soldier said to me ‘Pu Ma, 
Pol Pot is going to kill all of you. Run, you maybe get killed or you may escape.’199 She 
then ran to her mother’s village, but soon after her mother was executed, a young chhlop 
spoke to her: ‘Pu Ma, tonight at twelve o’clock they want to kill your family.’200 She then 
left with her brother and children, and decided to leave to Thailand, since she was living 
in the bordering province of Battambang. 
 As for external escape, internal escape seemed primarily motivated from the 
necessity to avoid execution. Yet as most cases of such escapes occurred within 
Cambodia, crossing boundaries was not necessary to attain a certain degree of safety. 
Once again, the differences within the Khmer Rouge organization were very important in 
determining the decisions taken by these Cambodians. In the last story, a Khmer Rouge 
soldier and a chhlop informed Pu Ma that her name was on the list for execution, thus she 
was able to avoid being killed. On the other hand, Pin Yathay’s execution was decided 
from a bitter Khmer Rouge soldier who resented his dismissal from his former employer. 
 Beyond the necessity to avoid execution, a few other factors motivated escapees. 
As deserters from the Khmer Rouge explained, they missed their families while in the 
revolutionary army, and the rigid rules of the Khmer Rouge prevented them to even visit, 
let alone quit their commitment. Ma Khin Me argued a different reason for internal 
escape.201 She had heard that the nearby village of Sre Tahen had abundant porridge in 
contrast with the portions given in her current village of Damnak Dangkao, thus she 
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subsequently decided to reach this village with her two children. Aware that such 
movements was not allowed, she gave her children into adoption to empathic villagers, as 
she feared to be execution. However, she was neither punished nor executed, and the 
village chief allowed her to remain in Sre Tahen. 
 Besides presenting another motive for flight, this story also illustrated the 
importance of local authorities and the fact that they ultimately decided their application 
of laws. Pin Simorn, who had been admitted to Saang Prison in Kandal in 1977, used her 
watch to bribe the prison guard for her freedom. The guard accepted and gave her 
directions to reach Siem Reap, where she stayed until the end of the regime.202 Some 
leaders or authority figures could have interpreted rules according to their own beliefs or 
altruism, but personal gain was also an important factor in their decision, as the next 
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Chapter 6: Black Market: The Price of Survival, Desire and Corruption 
  
The black market and the use of skills for private benefits offset the Khmer Rouge 
ideals of eliminating material desires or the value of higher education. Despite the 
abolition of private property, currency and markets within the first month of its rule, a 
market economy nevertheless emerged across its territory as small, autonomous markets 
based on barter. With the difficulty of mobility, those small markets were not integrated 
to each other thus exchange rates and values between different products varied greatly 
from one village to the next. The first part of this chapter examines the establishment and 
functioning of this parallel economy (in fact the sole existing economy), and the resulting 
relationship between new people, villagers and some Khmer Rouge themselves. 
This last chapter exposes how skilled new people, peasant base people, and local 
Khmer Rouge cadres circumvented the official goals of eliminating material desires and 
remnants of formal education and wealth. They succeeded doing so in establishing black 
markets and in ‘hiring’ skilled individuals for private benefits. Consequently, these 
processes defeated the officially-enforced segregation of these classes who found in some 
instances more benefits from this kind of cooperation. These widespread processes 
occurred outside the knowledge of a totalitarian regime that sought to control every 
aspect of the lives of its citizens; hence the existence of such black markets provide a 
powerful reminder of the possibility of agency even in such difficult times. 
After acquiring luxury goods, the Khmer Rouge also needed individuals who 
were able to maintain them in a functioning state, since no shops or markets existed. 
Hence, the Khmer Rouge requested the help of skilled individuals for their private 
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benefits in repairing watches, batteries and different vehicles. In other cases, they asked 
for skills as cooks, midwives, singers, dancers, painters or even alcohol makers. The 
second part of this chapter thus discusses the paradox of skilled individuals being 
effectively rewarded for their knowledge rather than punished as Khmer Rouge directives 
prescribed. Lower-rank Khmer Rouge approached most of those skilled individuals, but 
some even volunteered to offer their services despite the risk of exposing their identity to 
reprisals. Also, the desire to undermine educated individuals and the pursuit of autarky 
were often in opposition: former engineers were able to repair and operate machinery 
improving agricultural production and, in some cases, recycle goods deemed unnecessary 
in the current regime into useful contraptions. 
  
Black Market: From Aspirins to Omegas 
 
 François Ponchaud’s work on Democratic Kampuchea already mentioned the 
existence of trade. He referred to trade as the only alternative method to obtain more 
food, and observed that exchange rates between items varied from locality to locality 
within the same province.203 From his interviews, a refugee claimed that the Khmer 
Rouge themselves were organizing the barter to collect the gold from the evacuees.204 
Even if the ‘Khmer Rouge’ had been involved, this example does not explain if such a 
practice was part of an official secret policy, or if these low-level Khmer Rouge were 
actually reaping the rewards of such trade for private benefits. In this section, I will use 
examples to discuss with more clarity the nature of public or private transactions. 
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Overall, most of the trade was mostly self-interested and the Center did not seem 
involved in a systematic attempt to reach hidden wealth: opportunistic low-level cadres 
spearheaded their own trade. 
 Different groups with their own demands conducted the nascent trade across 
Cambodian territory, despite the efforts by the Center to eradicate any remnants of 
capitalist economy. Khmer Rouge property laws were quite simple and straightforward: 
‘Absolutely everything belongs to the Angkar.’205 ‘Illegal’ trade was first a privilege for 
those with surplus food to obtain prohibited or rare items at the beginning of the regime. 
As food and medicine became scarce and executions became more frequent, the black 
market gradually represented a necessity for survival for many of the new people. In 
seeking to alleviate hunger and disease, they chose to use the remnants of their 
possessions to increase their chances against death. Such trade was possible because base 
people generally suffered from relatively less severe hardships that the new people. As a 
result of the new people’s desperate demand, the value of basic food items like rice or 
fruits increased dramatically, and those items were traded in exchange for goods. Those 
simultaneous processes increased the volume of trade with time.   
 During their evacuation from different cities in Cambodia, many urbanites had 
been informed that they were only leaving temporarily to safeguard their lives from 
allegedly imminent American bombings. This Khmer Rouge claim revealed itself to be a 
ruse a few days following the relocation of all urbanites on the countryside. However, the 
urbanites’ reaction to this unexpected event varied: some had brought little with them, 
expecting indeed to return safely to their homes in a matter of days. Others also believed 
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they would be allowed to return, yet brought with them their valuables for fear of being 
robbed in their absence. Taken aback by the abrupt tone of this evacuation or witnessing 
some brutal executions, more fortunate urbanites rather decided to bring with them 
provisions and valuables in their distrust of the Khmer Rouge. The implications of such 
decision were important for the duration of the regime: some jewelry items and valuables 
were crucial during Democratic Kampuchea.  
 However, the Khmer Rouge foresaw that evacuees would leave with their 
possessions. On the national roads, blockades of Khmer Rouge soldiers were awaiting the 
citizens to collect documents, currencies and valuables. The different roadblocks stripped 
many Cambodians from their wealth, although some had dissimulated foreign currencies 
like Thai bahts, French francs and American dollars. The Cambodian riels had become 
worthless, but some still retained them at the beginning in hope of the reintroduction of 
currency. Amongst belongings liable to trade, there were photographs, pants, sarongs, 
kramas, jewelry, gold, suits, watches, scissors, tobacco, perfume, radios and other similar 
small items. Throughout that period, hiding those goods and bartering them in times of 
need proved crucial to the survival of many new people. Unfortunately, those with little 
provisions were greatly disadvantaged, both by the new social system and their 
incapacity to participate in the black market.  
 Trade was easier in the vicinity of base people. After the first wave of 
evacuations, the base people shared their villages with the evacuees, which facilitated the 
conduct of exchanges. However, in the second massive relocation, new people were 
displaced to fringe areas in previously unpopulated jungles and had to establish new 
villages and work camps. In other parts of Cambodia, new and base people were 
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segregated in different villages. Considering the difficulty of movement, interactions 
between new and base people required stealthy meetings. As a community chief at the 
beginning of the regime, Moeung Sonn lamented that some new people pretended to be 
sick in order to trade with the base people in the afternoon while everybody else was 
toiling the fields.206 
 By aspiring to refashion Cambodians into revolutionaries, the Khmer Rouge 
imposed an ascetic lifestyle on them and their soldiers. The Khmer Rouge thus wore 
standard black pajamas, as were the base people. Evacuees wore the same clothes from 
their evacuation, and some dyed them into darker colors. External adornments like 
watches, make-up and jewelry were equally forbidden. In the words of the government: 
‘Physical beauty hinders the will to struggle.’207 
On the other side of the market, base people primarily bought precious items and 
sold food. Since most references to the black market were coming from interviews from 
former new people, such motives for purchasing luxury goods at a time of crisis are 
unknown, particularly since adorning accessories could be punishable by death. 
Arguably, their desires for those items may have arisen from their lingering desire for 
previously unattainable possessions. Regardless of their motives, the discrepancy in the 
access to food between the two social groups allowed the base people from utilizing this 
advantage for their personal gain.  
 The existence of such an economic relationship between two supposedly 
segregated classes of Cambodians represents a small aspect of complex interactions 
between both groups. Fueled by propaganda from the Khmer Rouge, the base people had 
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been encouraged to detest the evacuated urbanites and correspondingly, many urbanites 
reacted by reinforcing their pre-existing prejudices against Cambodian peasants and 
accusing them of complicity with the Khmer Rouge. Yet the existence of barter between 
both groups sometimes eased and facilitated the communication between new and old 
people. Hence, at least on a short scale, the divide-and-rule policies based on class 
differences were in part leveled through mutual benefits.  In one case, however, villagers 
refused to an urbanite woman the privilege to trade: Veng Chong had collected corn and 
intended to trade it for fish with the base people in order to feed her sick daughters.208 
Instead of gaining some food, she rather received a sermon from the villagers: ‘You’re 
living on us, how dare you trade? You should know, we liberated you.’209 After this 
refusal, she did not dare to try to trade again. 
 In addition to base and new people, many local cadres and soldiers decided to 
enter the black market to obtain material goods. High-level Khmer Rouge leaders were 
living comfortable lives and benefited from different luxury goods. As the executive 
branch of the government, they could access this lifestyle ‘legally’ using policies that 
they would articulate themselves. In contrast, lower-level Khmer Rouge desiring to 
improve their lifestyles had to find alternatives ways to bypass the strict ownership rules 
that also applied to them. A possible way to obtain their desired goals was to execute new 
people and grab their possessions. There were quite a few instances of such personally 
motivated executions. 
 Pin Yathay also described another possible link between executions and economic 
benefits. He noticed that rice was allocated to each camp depending on the number of 
                                                 
208
 Veng Chhong, Searching for the Truth, First Quarter 2004, 37. 
209
 Ibid: 38. 
 105
people residing there according to their daily quotas. Since the local cadres had control 
over the lists of their dependents, they were in a position to decide to report whether a 
person died or not. At the same time, the cadres traded using quantities of leftover rice 
from individuals who no longer needed it. Hence, Pin formulated the hypothesis that 
these leaders could use executions to access more rice for trade.210 While such practice 
presents a surprising new motive behind executions, there has not been other evidence to 
validate the fact that this practice occurred elsewhere in Cambodia, or even to confirm 
Pin’s claims.  
 Executions seemed like a simple way to secure more goods, but new people hid 
their valuables, hence the Khmer Rouge were not aware of the existence or location of 
these goods. The black market thus provided an effective way to secure these items. All 
parties engaging in such trade usually had recourse to intermediaries for the transactions. 
This way, the new people did not expose themselves directly to the Khmer Rouge, but 
they still received food and medicine in exchange. These intermediaries, either new or 
base people, would usually keep a portion of rice as a fee for their services.  
 In a position of power, the Khmer Rouge also received bribes in exchange for 
some services. Those ‘services’ varied. For instance, Pom Sarun bribed a nurse to receive 
better food and be transferred to a better hospital.211 The current director of DC-Cam, 
Youk Chhang, remembered that his mother had given the camp leader scissors to ensure 
that he would not have to work during the regime.212 Serey Len Deour similarly 
remembered that her mother used jewelry to be reassigned to caring for children instead 
of working in the fields; she also obtained the right of her son to visit his father with 
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another bribe.213 Finally, soon after the Khmer Rouge victory, Sophanarith Mean’s father, 
a border patrolman, tried to cross to Thailand with all his family, only to find that Khmer 
Rouge soldiers already blocked his route.214 However, he discussed with their leader and 
could pay his way through with the valuables at their disposal. In short, these stories 
present different examples of the use of bribes for different ends. 
 Finally, the Khmer Rouge had a particular incentive to trade as they could use 
some items to display their hierarchical position. Even though the Khmer Rouge uniform 
consisted only of a plain black pajama, a red krama and sandals made from tires, there 
were a few subtle ways to differentiate between ranks and swagger with their attire. First 
of all, higher-ranking Khmer Rouge had more clothes and did not labor in the fields; as a 
result, the quality, cleanliness and integrity of their pajamas differed from those who only 
had one set of clothing to work and sleep in. Second, the textile used for their krama 
varied in quality, and silk scarves were the most valued and expensive. Third, besides 
their symbolic rubber sandals, they could adorn themselves with the ‘Mao caps’ 
characteristic of the Chinese Communist movement, and had a high revolutionary 
significance even in Cambodia. Fourth, as only Khmer Rouge cadres had the power to 
write the all-important travel permits or the execution lists, pens were used to display 
their special privileges. They often wore them visibly in their pockets, with the largest 
part of the pen showing at the front.215  
Watches were another item of significance and most Khmer Rouge collected them 
from the new people during the evacuations. As in the previous regime, those automatic 
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watches were recognizable according to their corresponding quality and brand, and 
watches of the ‘Omega’ brand were the most prized of all. Overall, despite the asceticism 
prescribed by the Party, new subtle ways were available to the Khmer Rouge to 
distinguish themselves from the people. Teeda Butt Mann, an evacuee from Phnom Penh 
now residing in the United States, summarized the situation as such: 
But while the entire population was dying of starvation, disease, and 
hopelessness, the Khmer Rouge was creating a new upper class. Their soldiers 
and the Communist Party members were able to choose any woman or man they 
wanted to marry. In addition to boundless food, they were crazed with gold, 
jewelry, perfume, imported watches, western medicine, cars, motorcycles, 
bicycles, silk and other imported goods. [...] While [female soldiers] were 
enjoying their nice black pajamas, silk scarves, jewelry, new shoes, perfume, 
they stared at me, seeing if I had anything better than they did.216 
 
 This assessment of behavior from lower-level Khmer Rouge cadres seems 
accurate in addressing the importance of material goods. Other accounts supported her 
view that members of the Khmer Rouge replaced the former elite rather than eliminated 
classes in Cambodia. However, this claim carries a certain bias of perception, as mostly 
former urbanites, the most disadvantaged of this new regime, supported this claim of the 
reversal of classes. These new people also usually accused base people of cooperating 
with the Khmer Rouge unconditionally, a claim disproved by several researchers. In 
short, this corruption and materialism in lower-level cadres existed in many instances, but 
it cannot be generalized to all Khmer Rouge. 
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Trade Creation and Tobacco Addiction 
  
 Pin Yathay’s life in Veal Vong and his description of the process of trade 
provides important insights in the creation and mechanism of trade during the Khmer 
Rouge regime.217 He was displaced in Veal Vong, a jungle village in the province of 
Pursat in proximity of a village of base people. Once there, he noticed the trade between 
new and base people exchanging luxury objects and rice allowances. From routine barter, 
Pin remembered systematic exchange rates taking place: trousers were exchanged for ten 
boxes of rice, a shirt for four, and a sarong for six. For gold, one tael yielded 30 or 40 
boxes, depending on the value of the gold or the estimate of the jewelry’s worth.  
 Like some new people, Pin had a large amount of American dollars that were 
deemed worthless in that current trade, except to purchase jewelry. Hence, he decided to 
manipulate the market in order to increase the value of his 3,000 American dollars and 
gain more rice as a result. He first collected 40 boxes of rice with clothes and jewels, then 
proceeded to obtain 200 American dollars in exchange for 20 boxes of rice via a Chinese 
courtier. When the news reached other new people, they decided to use their stock of 
American dollars for immediate purchases instead of waiting for an eventual escape. As a 
result, instead of buying only 10 boxes of rice, 100 dollars could now be exchanged for 
15 boxes. Pin then spent as much as 1000 dollars in order to secure a large provision of 
rice for him and his large family. Once he left Veal Vong for another village, he also 
noticed that the exchange rates were different and that the market was not as elaborate as 
in the jungle.  
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 This example illustrates that the small markets were functioning like larger 
economies, and were subject to fluctuations based on demand and supply. Interestingly, 
Pin observed that the Khmer Rouge were partaking as well in this market, and that they 
were generally honest during transactions. In fact, their relatives were usually involved in 
trade on their behalf. This example also shows that the Khmer Rouge were taking part in 
trade for their personal benefits, and still had to comply with the ‘rules of the market’ in 
dealing with new people, despite the explicit power difference between the two groups. 
 Tobacco became important in trade across all groups and was neither a 
subsistence item nor a luxury good. Several cases mentioned the use and trade of tobacco, 
and Meng Raksmey’s essay on his experience during Kampuchea, ‘Tobacco and I’, 
provides an insightful summary on the use and trade of tobacco.218  
 As a teenager from Phnom Penh relocated in a mobile unit in Kandal, Meng had 
to toil endlessly on dams and channels along with other April 17 people. With time, he 
observed that the unit leader allowed quick breaks for the smokers, representing a 
significant relief from continuous hard labor. Hence, he decided to learn how to smoke 
gradually by sucking on the smoke of other smokers. Considering the lack of paper or 
filters, the smokers had to hand-roll the tobacco using banana leaves and light their 
cigarettes on a bonfire. This elaborate process allowed him and others to take longer 
pauses and facilitated friendships with base people.  
 Reflecting on the larger commerce of tobacco, Meng mused that ‘cigarettes are 
everything.’ He meant that tobacco could be traded for any other good: ‘palm tree brown 
sugar, chickens, dried salt fish, salt corn, yams and so on.’219 Such intrinsic value was 
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quite helpful considering that he used to receive a weekly ration of tobacco for personal 
consumption or trade. Tobacco probably enjoyed such a high demand as other forms of 
entertainment were prohibited, and it provided some relief from anxiety as well. Meng 
finally added that ‘sometimes I traded tobacco with my unit chief, thinking I could barter 
my survival.’  
 
Skills- “Keep for a While” 
 
 As part of their social engineering project, the Khmer Rouge undermined higher 
education from previous regimes. In a slogan compiled by Henri Locard, Angkar claimed 
that ‘there are no more diplomas, only diplomas one can visualize.’220 This slogan simply 
meant that the Khmer Rouge only valued concrete achievements attained through 
physical labor such as dams and rice fields. Consequently, refugees reported that 
educated Cambodians were ‘suspected, hunted out, often arrested and executed.’221 Like 
other aspects of their former identity, holding a degree was officially liable for 
persecution. However, this chapter provides counter-examples to this generally 
acknowledged perception. While there were obvious instances of discrimination against 
educated Cambodians, some cases demonstrate that their knowledge and qualifications 
sometimes provided a viable way to survive the regime.  
 In their new education policy, the Khmer Rouge offered daily political meetings 
to all Cambodians after their daily work. But besides those sessions, they did not seek to 
educate teenagers and adults, considering that they have been already exposed to 
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capitalist ideas. Instead, they favored teaching children, regardless of their previous 
backgrounds, as they thought their minds would be more receptive to their revolutionary 
ideas. As testimonies from children of urban background after the regime exposed, even 
younger children with previous education were able to discern the misguided teachings 
from the Khmer Rouge, and this realization possibly reinforced their perception of 
difference in contrast with those local leaders of peasant background. Another problem 
for the Khmer Rouge was the fact that in their determination to teach children whom they 
considered ‘blank slates’, they had the peculiar obstacle of finding these children ‘too 
blank.’  
 Despite the official policy on educated people and the assumption that they were 
unilaterally persecuted, many educated or skilled Cambodians managed to survive or 
have an easier life by using their knowledge or skills. Perhaps the most obvious examples 
were the survivors from the S-21 security complex. At the end of the regime, only nine 
Cambodians were found alive in S-21; after some research, the Vietnamese realized that 
these fortunate few were the sole survivors from the 17,000 prisoners who had been 
captured and executed. These survivors all shared an aspect in common: they had skills 
that the Khmer Rouge exploited, thus received more freedom. In the official lists, beside 
their name, was the mention ‘keep for a while.’222 One of these survivors was Bou Meng, 
a villager who had learnt to paint on his own.223 When Duch, the prison chief, was 
looking for a painter to produce a portrait of Pol Pot, Bou volunteered. Under the threat 
of execution if his task was not carried out successfully, he nevertheless survived his 
ordeal in the prison.  
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 The story of Chum Manh, a motorcycle repairman from Phnom Penh, is quite 
similar.224 During the evacuation, he had already decided to propose his skills to the 
Khmer Rouge, and headed for Prek Kdam to offer his help. In that location, he was 
assigned to recycle automobile engines into boat engines, and had to also repair 
automobiles, tractors and microphones. He was eventually sent to Phnom Penh, but like 
Bou Meng, he was asked to put his skills to use by repairing sewing machines. Besides 
his name in the execution list was the same mention of ‘keep for a while.’ Among the 
other S-21 survivors were Ruy Nea Khong, a carpenter, Heng Nath and Iem Chan, 
sculptors, and Ing Pech, a machinery repairman.225 Thus, there was a direct correlation 
between these particular survivors and the usefulness of their skills for the Angkar. 
In other jails throughout Cambodia, people with special skills were able to 
improve their living conditions by offering their services. Som Rithy, jailed in Siem 
Reap, claimed that ‘I managed to survive because I was skilled in repairing 
motorbikes.’226 Some Khmer Rouge soldiers had asked him to repair a motorcycle, and 
from that day, he routinely repaired more vehicles for the Khmer Rouge. He considered 
he owed his life to his skill because of the ominous directive that came with broken 
motorbikes: ‘You must repair these well, otherwise, I will take your life.’227 In Kraing Ta 
Cheng prison in the south of the country, Say Sen survived for a quite different reason: 
the prison chief was quite fond of alcohol made from sour palm juice and Say knew how 
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to produce it.228 In return, he was able to circulate freely in jail, instead of being shackled 
all day like other prisoners.  
 Until this point, the skilled individuals survived during their incarceration, and 
while there were a few instances of volunteering, the Khmer Rouge asked these prisoners 
to collaborate. Thus the extent of decision-making involved in the process remains 
debatable. The importance of this survival strategy becomes clearer outside the prison 
system, when some Cambodians volunteered their skills and utilized them to improve 
their lives. As transpired from the examples cited above, there was a fine line between 
collective and private benefits obtained from the use of these skills. Moeung Sonn’s 
contraptions or the repair of motorboats seems more leaning toward the public good, yet 
the brewing of alcohol, repair of watches and portraits for Pol Pot illustrate how these 
skilled individuals were used for private benefits, which also meant outside the reach of 
the Angkar by local Khmer Rouge. The following cases also correspond to that self-
interested utilization of skills. 
 Meas Phally, a new person from Phnom Penh, remembered how she obtained the 
good graces of a female Khmer Rouge leader after a work accident.229 The unit chief 
cared for her personally, and in return, Meas sang to her several traditional songs to 
entertain her. Afterwards, this leader managed to have her work indoors most of the time. 
This decision brought some scorn from resentful peasant women, but the unit leader 
continued to protect her protégée. Chey Phon also enjoyed special favors from the Khmer 
Rouge.230 He explains that his hard work may explain his special position, but he also 
                                                 
228
 Say Sen, Searching for the Truth, First Quarter 2005, 17-19. 
229
 Meas Phally, Searching for the Truth, Second Quarter 2005, 49-52. 
230
 Chey Phon, Searching for the Truth, Fourth Quarter 2005, 15-17. 
 114
acknowledges that the Khmer Rouge seemed to enjoy his skill in playing the tro.231 For 
that reason, the cooperative asked him and other musicians for a daily performance, for 
which he received a cigarette. It would seem as a meager salary, but considering the 
value of tobacco during Democratic Kampuchea, it proved quite valuable for survival. 
Finally, some base people were also willing to pay for entertainment according to Sinith 
Heng.232 While he did not play any particular instrument, the villagers appreciated his 
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Even though the events discussed in this thesis occurred more than three decades 
ago, Cambodians today can still feel the repercussions of this major human tragedy of the 
twentieth century. The Khmer Rouge regime has been studied extensively from different 
angles, and the works of the many scholars on that topic paved the way for studying other 
aspects of Cambodian society, beyond recollections of suffering and individual survival 
tales. In fact, Kiernan’s mention of the resistance of Cambodians against the Khmer 
Rouge convinced me of the pertinence of looking for other instances of coping with this 
totalitarian threat. While this thesis did not aim to construct a social history, it did 
overview major themes – recruitment, compliance, resistance, escape and barter – that 
represented major actions taken by Cambodians to cope with those trying and 
uncharacteristic times. Through the recollection of these individual – perhaps anecdotal – 
events, I intended to present another side to life during the Khmer Rouge regime. After 
all, the regime lasted for more than three years, and it appears as self-evident that humans 
found ways to circumvent incredibly oppressive conditions.  
This thesis could also pave the way for further research documenting the social 
history of Democratic Kampuchea. A more in-depth research using a larger number of 
sources in Khmer, including more cases from DC-Cam, personal interviews, records from 
the S-21 security system and official Khmer Rouge documents would yield a more 
accurate and generalizable portrait of the situation. Instead of emphasizing on these 
various ‘themes,’ a more in-depth social history could be framed chronologically, as 
much as possible. Finding a definite time-frame could prove to be a challenge however, 
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as many interviewees did not or could not remember the date of occurrence of important 
events.  
Another methodology could involve researching in more details the interactions 
within a single work camp/village. This project would require finding as many accounts 
and interviewees as possible from a precise location to analyze the development and 
complexity of interactions between Khmer Rouge officials, militia, base people and new 
people over time. Such a framework could eliminate certain inaccuracies and false 
information through cross-referencing the different stories provided. However, in order to 
represent a fair representation of Cambodia, specific particularities of that location must 
be taken into account.  
 Also, any chapter discussed in this thesis could yield sufficient material to be the 
focus of a single research or thesis. This present thesis only provided an overview of 
some issues that could benefit from further research. For instance, the topic of ‘freedom 
fighters’ represents an interesting aspect of the struggle for resistance between the Khmer 
Rouge and Cambodian people, but information on the topic so far is still too scarce and 
vague to determine their impact on the regime.  
 For more contemporary considerations, this topic evokes the notion of memory. 
Even though the majority of Cambodians were born after the Khmer Rouge regime -due 
to the predominance of youths-, the repercussions of the regime can still be felt in 
Cambodian society and politics. Yet, until very recently, the topic of the ‘Pol Pot regime’ 
was not thought in school, and was much less open for public debate. In fact, by the time 
of submitting this thesis (November 2009), Cambodian high school students are receiving 
their first history book on the period, Kamboly Dy’s A History of Democratic 
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Kampuchea (1975-1979), a publication from the Documentation Centre of Cambodia.233 
Simultaneously, the international tribunal is examining the case of ‘Comrade Duch’, the 
director of the infamous S-21 prison and now one of the few prosecuted officials of the 
former Khmer Rouge.  
While these developments offer encouraging prospects for memory and justice in 
Cambodia, they are still the result of various political interests. Ashley Thompson noted 
in her article, Mémoires du Cambodge, the cyclical ‘loss of memory’ and ‘rediscovery of 
Cambodia’ which occurs since the beginning of the French protectorate:  
 
The latest saviors of Cambodia – those who just arrived - complain once more 
about the abominable loss of history: History is lost, and it is History itself which 
produced this loss. Its elite almost exterminated, its archives and social networks 
destroyed, Cambodia, as it is said, even lost its memory: once again. […] Using 
schoolbooks and tribunals, without forgetting the restoration of the Angkor site – 
immense construction yard for monuments to the dead, as a matter of fact – we 
took upon ourselves the mission to restitute memory to a forgetful Cambodia.234 
 
 It would be tempting to become cynical at the perspective that, on the one hand, 
foreign scholars seek to educate Cambodians on their lost history/memory; while on the 
other, some scholars claim that Cambodians do not have the necessary skills for analysis 
and are more useful in collecting data.235 Hopefully, in the future, Cambodians will be 
better equipped to write about their history and address their own memory.  
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